



PREMIER MINISTRE

THE INTERNATIONAL AND STRATEGIC EVOLUTIONS FACED BY FRANCE

Preparatory document
for the update of the
White paper on Defence
and national security

Secrétariat général
de la défense et de
la sécurité nationale

Foreword

The 2008 *White Paper on Defence and National Security* stressed the need for regular updates, given the speed at which the strategic context evolves. This update is planned for after the upcoming presidential elections.

The proposals set out in the following pages are the result of an interministerial collaboration with contributions from numerous French and foreign experts. The sole aim of this document is to prepare the future work required for updating the *White Paper on Defence and National Security* by illustrating the strategic environment we are going to face until 2020 and by isolating the issues that will form the structure of our defence and security at this horizon. It is not intended either to represent the entirety of our defence and national security policy, or to set out our foreign policy or an elaborate economic analysis of the current situation.

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Introduction

In its analysis of the international and strategic context, the 2008 White Paper on Defence and National Security set out four major findings:

- ▶ *A Strategic uncertainty associated with globalisation*, characterised by an interaction and a generalised, uncontrolled interdependence between all States. This was a major shift from what was pointed out in the previous White Paper in 1994, when globalisation marked the entry into a “new era”. The main characteristics of this transformation identified by the White Paper included positive developments, such as an increase in the number of democracies, the growth of the internet, a reduction in the number of armed conflicts, the international society’s capacity to mobilise and some progress in European integration. The worrying factors mentioned included the downsides of globalisation, in particular the rapid spread of all types of crises and the uncontrolled explosion in the movement of people, goods and ideas. These trends being combined with a multiplication in the forms of violence, an increase in military spending worldwide and the continuing existence of unresolved crises, globalisation was painting the picture of a more uncertain and more unstable world.
- ▶ *A progressive shift in the strategic centre of gravity towards Asia*, described as one of the most important changes in the strategic landscape. The emergence of new powers, particularly India and China, would, by 2025, make Asia one of the major hubs in international life, alongside Europe and America. In parallel, the comparative decline in Western powers was highlighted, although it was stressed that the US would remain the reference.
- ▶ *The existence of four critical areas for France, including a crisis arc spanning from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean* and covering Northern Africa, the Sahel area, the Horn of Africa, the Near East, the Arab-Persian Gulf and the Afghani-Pakistani area. Although it was not considered a homogeneous ensemble, this area regrouped a list of factors liable to affect our security and that of Europe. Sub-Saharan Africa, the European continent and Asia were the other three critical regions for the security and interests of France and Europe.

- ▶ *The development of new vulnerabilities* for the European territory and citizens. These include jihadist terrorism, seen as one of the main threats to our security. The threat of missiles, the possibility of major attacks against information systems, the development of criminal trafficking and technological, natural and health risks were seen as the other main threats to our security. These vulnerabilities justified the creation of a continuity between internal security and external security, via the concept of “national security”.

The analysis and findings made in 2008 remain on the whole relevant. The serious trends identified at that time, particularly the structuring nature of globalisation and the shift of the geostrategic centre of gravity towards Asia, have been confirmed since 2008. The vulnerabilities and threats faced by international security and French security remain. The cyber menace has grown stronger, as has the threat posed by cross-border organised crime. Proliferation crises, especially the crisis in Iran, have intensified. Natural, health and technological risks have materialised, as shown by the Fukushima tragedy in Japan. Tensions in strategic areas (sea, air, cybernetic and space) are mounting, in a situation of heightened competition between powers, whereas the issue of securing strategic resources is gaining in importance.

However, the international and strategic situation has changed rapidly and profoundly since 2008, under the influence of determining events and developments whose scope was difficult to predict:

- ▶ *Transformations in the Arab world and their potential consequences.* First in Tunisia at the end of 2010 then in the entire Near and Middle East, the suddenness and scale of the Arab uprisings made them a strategic surprise. They triggered a long-lasting momentum that will redefine fundamental political, economic and social conditions in the countries of North Africa and the Middle East, in a way that will have a durable impact on regional power balances and will have repercussions on a global scale. These upheavals place the Mediterranean at the heart of the strategic issues facing France.
- ▶ *The global economic and financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis* constitute radically new factors that were not mentioned in the previous White Paper. They brought economic issues to the fore in international discussions. The systemic global crisis of 2008 actually began in the USA in 2007 and is the most serious economic crisis since 1945. It revealed of pre-existing fragilities in numerous States, especially European, and as a catalyst for the major trends already at work but whose rapidity and scale could not have been anticipated. In particular, it highlighted the increase in the economic and geostrategic weight of major emerging countries - the first among them being China - the strengthened ties of interdependence and inadequacies in international regulation.
- ▶ *The end of an American strategic sequence.* The period that began the day after the 11th of September 2001, marked by the American commitment to the “global war against terror”, is coming to an end. The United States remains the single overarching global power and looks likely to remain in that position until 2025. However, the way in which this power is exercised changed significantly since 2008, under the effect of the economic and financial crisis and the changes in strategic direction effected by the Obama administration. This revision of America’s stance could thus mark the end of the American defence cycle that commenced in 2001 and was characterised by commitment to large-scale, long-term operations. The question of the duration and the repercussions of this change of stance on global stability remains unanswered.

- ▶ *The evolution of the jihadist terrorist threat.* Ten years after the attacks of the 11th of September 2001, jihadist terrorism is still present but it is evolving. Al-Qaida has failed to capitalise on its potential to inflict harm at a strategic level and the international efforts directed at combating terrorism have further shattered the central command of the organisation, which has lost its charismatic leader and a large part of its general staff. However, jihadist terrorism still has a very great potential to cause harm and the terrorist threat, although more diluted now, has not lost in intensity.

In this context, and in accordance with the positions set out in the White Paper, as complemented by the 2009 National Strategy for Sea and Oceans and the White Paper on French Foreign Policy, France's strategic posture has moved forward since 2008. The confirmation of the strong trends identified in the White Paper in terms of security and defence, and the significant evolutions which have since occurred, shape a new international and strategic environment, as well as the issues that France must tackle if it is to resolutely preserve its security interests. In a context where the level of risk and violence in the world is not declining and defence spending is rising considerably in numerous regions, preserving its strategic autonomy is a priority for France. It will have to ensure that its level of strategic ambition is in line with its budgetary commitment to national security in order to continue the actions undertaken since 2008 aimed at protecting its territory and population, and its actions in favour of international security and conflict prevention. Our policy must espouse the changes in multilateralism and collective defence. France's defence interests will remain at the heart of the issue, via the building of the European security and joint defence policy, the reinforcement of our European partnerships and the return of France into the military structure of NATO.

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The strategic analysis set out in the 2008 White Paper has been confirmed

The analysis given in the White Paper has been confirmed to a very large extent since 2008. Globalisation is still a central parameter with regard to the strategic context, and plays a fundamental role in structuring international relations and security. It offers opportunities, associated with the increase of all types of exchanges, but it also has its downsides, particularly in economic, social and environmental terms. The international situation furthermore remains characterised by vulnerabilities affecting security and global stability. The spectre of armed violence is looming ever greater, with the growth of asymmetrical practices and a heightened risk of inter-State conflicts. Open crises and tensions persist, including in areas of strategic interest for our security. In parallel, the risks and threats facing our society that were identified in 2008 (cyber threat, proliferation, technological, natural and health risks; and organised cross-border crime) have materialised, or have turned out to be even more serious than anticipated. In an environment where the pace of exchanges is accelerating, competition for access to strategic, energy, scientific and technological resources has become fiercer.

Globalisation remains the determining process to define the structure of the international strategic environment

An acceleration in globalisation


The White Paper emphasised the fact that globalisation had a long-term effect on dictating the course of international relations and security. Four years later, this analysis has been confirmed in its entirety: growing interdependence and a considerable increase in all types of flows are contributing to an ever-greater extent towards dictating the structure of the global environment, which is marked by the increasing weight of non-State players and the growing role of companies on the international stage. Globalisation is also a powerful growth factor. Buoyed by developments in exchanges and flows, the overall figure for global GDP could thus triple between 2005 and 2030 (*see map of economic power hubs*).

The virtual portion of globalisation is growing. The widespread distribution of new information and communication technologies acts as an unprecedented development vector for financial, commercial, human and political flows. This explosion is compressing time and space, ripping up the international rulebook, fundamentally transforming relations between States and companies and changing the conditions for the production and distribution of wealth, goods and labour.

International financial flows currently represent more than ten times the global GDP, and the volume of exchange transactions by itself represents 50 times the volume of goods and service transactions. This explosion in virtual flows, characterised by a real-time distribution of data, information, images and ideas, gives companies new means of asserting themselves and becoming autonomous. In this regard, the Arab uprisings confirmed the importance of virtual 'social networks', which by enabling users to circumvent official censorship acted as a sounding board for the events that triggered the uprisings, and clearly played a role in terms of mobilising or organising and leading protest movements.

This continued acceleration in globalisation furthermore underlines the strategic nature of cultural and political influence tools in terms of "soft power", as well as the more traditional components of power, can have for States.

In this context, the gradual shift in the strategic centre of gravity towards Asia, which had been identified in the White Paper, has accelerated, with the growth of several countries, not least of which being China, which has managed to take full advantage of globalisation and of the consequent interdependences to consolidate its economic boom (*see Part II*).



A rise in economic and social challenges

Among the downsides of globalisation highlighted by the White Paper was the rise in social and economic inequalities, and the existence of growing competition to meet needs for energy, water, food and raw materials. The changes that have taken place since 2008 have confirmed the relevance of these analyses.

The global economic crisis has exacerbated the economic and social repercussions of imbalances worldwide, aggravating a long-term trend in this regard. These imbalances make themselves felt not only in terms of the distribution of revenues within a given country or region but also at a global level. Notwithstanding a reduction in extreme poverty on a global scale, thanks in particular to the progress made in Asia, whole regions not only on the Asian continent but also in Latin America and Africa are still denied the benefits of global growth. For example, 20 % of the world's population consume 80 % of its resources, raising the question of who will be left on the 'sidelines' of the globalised world.

The gap between the richest and the poorest is widening, even in developed and emerging countries, leading to a greater risk of destabilisation or even political crises that could spread to neighbouring regions. This rise in inequalities especially undermines some emerging countries in their search to follow their growth path.

Although the social and economic impact of the crisis remains difficult to quantify in Western and European countries for the time being, it has already reached a level not seen since the Second World War in the most heavily-hit countries, giving rise to large-scale protest movements and acute political unrest that has the potential to topple national governments (Greece, Italy, Slovakia, Ireland, Spain and Portugal). To a lesser extent, the growing sensation of precariousness worldwide has triggered the emergence of the worldwide phenomenon of "the outraged"¹, who are expressing their anger at their governments and elites for economic and social inequalities. These movements appear to symbolise a new form of mobilisation and protest by those 'left by the wayside' by globalisation.

Under the combined effect of demographic factors, economic factors (accelerated growth, particularly in emerging countries; urbanisation; industrialisation; increased revenues; and uniformisation of lifestyles) and environmental factors (climate change; soil depletion; deforestation; desertification; and pollution), the issue of natural resources – drinking water, arable land, foodstuffs, raw materials – is becoming increasingly crucial in some regions of the world. The main problem is not one of the physical limits of reserves but of access to resources (unequal availability, allocation and distribution) and, even more, of the cost of accessing these resources on international markets, particularly with regard to foodstuffs. As a result of the imbalance between supply and demand, linked particularly to economic and demographic growth in emerging countries, the increasing importance of biofuels and the export restrictions imposed by certain producing countries, agricultural markets have undergone several highly tense episodes since 2005, which have resulted in price rises and high volatility.

Although the global food situation has not worsened, the food crisis continues. This crisis is felt particularly keenly in less developed countries, especially in Africa, that are facing a shrinkage in the extent of usable arable land (as a result of climate change), have few resources and rely heavily on agricultural markets for their supply of basic commodities. Supposedly less fragile countries can also suffer the consequences of tensions in the markets. This is true of Egypt and Mexico, which both underwent riots, following rises in the price of foodstuffs in 2007.

¹ - Almost 80 countries saw demonstrations, in Europe but also in Asia, Israel and the US. Although these movements by 'the outraged' were triggered by national issues, they do have points in common: the mobilisation of young urban citizens, mostly middle class, and the role of social networks in the cohesion of these movements.

Above and beyond their disastrous consequences in humanitarian terms, food crises could result in the destabilisation of States or regions by triggering “high cost of living riots” liable to jeopardise existing regimes, by generating migratory flows or massive population movements, or even by exacerbating tensions within or between States with regard to access to resources. Powers such as Russia and China have started to import food commodities and have thus become even more exposed to the abrupt variations in their cost. Soaring agricultural prices in 2007-2008 thus contributed to the development of land acquisition strategies, particularly among emerging countries that rely on imports for their food supply, partially with the aim of ensuring security of supply. Such international land investments can generate high levels of tension with local populations in the poorest countries, as illustrated by the example of Madagascar, where the massive purchase of land by a South Korean company triggered the downfall of President Ravalomanana in 2009.

The spectre of armed violence is growing

An eruption of asymmetrical practices

Since 2008, the predominance of infra-State or asymmetrical conflict situations has been confirmed. Infra-State conflicts, which exploit religious and ethnic divides that for the most part are based on resource distribution problems, remain the majority of cases. The fragility of some states unable to assume their sovereign duties, to control their territories and to protect their people and meet the food requirements of their population is fostering the appearance of lawless areas where terrorist movements or criminal groups can operate. This situation can often aggravate conflicts, especially across borders.

Asymmetry² remains an action plan favoured by certain States to compensate for their lack of military and technological might. Although terrorist acts against a population are the most striking manifestation of this policy, asymmetrical practices are also commonplace in military theatres against armed forces. Asymmetrical warfare, which aims to target the enemy’s vulnerabilities at a lower human, material and financial cost, is facilitated by the technological supremacy of Western armies. It is also promoted by the increasingly easy access to fairly sophisticated military or dual-use technologies at minimal cost, and by the growth of illegal trafficking.

A risk of the resurgence of inter-State conflicts

Inter-State wars continue to be rare and the nuclear threat remains an important deterrent between major powers. The confrontation between Russia and Georgia in 2008 nonetheless acted as a reminder that crises can degenerate into armed conflicts, including on our continent. Heightened tensions with regard to resources, the uncertain political mutations undergone by countries in a state of transition and the economic and financial difficulties of the developed world are all liable to favour the resurgence of inter-State conflicts. The significant increase in defence spending and conventional arsenals in some regions of the world, ballistic proliferation, programmes for the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and the widespread use of sophisticated dual-use technologies are leading to the appearance in some areas of significant growths in military power and the capacity for high-intensity engagement..

² - Between a state system and a non-state system.

Crises are continuing

Crises that were severe at the time when the White Paper was published in 2008 have since played out (Ivory Coast, Southern Sudan, Sri Lanka and Chad). Nonetheless, the number of unresolved or frozen conflicts has not fallen, and structural tensions between States remain, or have even worsened, and the zones affected by political tensions and conflicts has widened, in 2011 in particular.

Areas of tension at the Eastern borders of Europe

The European continent is still marked by tensions from unresolved conflicts and the fragility of certain States created after the break-up of the USSR and Yugoslavia.

No progress has been made since 2008 towards resolving the 'frozen' conflicts within the post-Soviet area (Transnistria, Upper Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia). During the Russo-Georgian War of August 2008, the European continent was even the theatre for open conflict. This war, followed by the recognition of the independence of both separatist entities by Russia, further diminished the possibility that the conflict that has been ravaging Georgian territory for the past twenty years will be resolved.

In the Balkans, Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008 did not lead to any new conflict with Serbia, the latter having begun the process of integration into the European Union. However, the security situation in the north of Kosovo remains fragile.

Uncertain return to peace and unresolved crises in Africa

Since 2008, sub-Saharan Africa has been marked by significant progress in numerous crises, leading to a return to civil peace and the normalisation of political processes, particularly in Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mauritania and Niger. The reconciliation between Chad and Sudan and between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda saw the end of a long period of tension and confrontation. However, the crisis resolution processes remain fragile and major structural problems persist (growing competition for arable land, pressure on natural resources, political exploitation of ethnic and religious issues, State weakness, etc.).

At the same time, other crises remain unresolved (Darfur) or have even worsened (Gulf of Guinea, Horn of Africa) owing to a combination of factors of instability (political tensions, terrorism and piracy). Although the creation of South Sudan, which took place peacefully, represents a major step forward, it failed to put an end to the conflict between Juba and Khartoum. The way South Sudan will evolve is furthermore unknown and risks having repercussions on the entire region. New crises could arise over the next few years, particularly in countries where the existing regimes are disputed while they seek to cling on to power.

Areas of conflict from the Eastern Mediterranean to Southern Asia

The area of conflict, identified in the White Paper as extending from the Eastern Mediterranean to Southern Asia, continues to be a focal point for some of the most acute unresolved crises on the planet. The worsening of the Iranian proliferation crisis, combined with the stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the tensions in Lebanon and the new areas of instability associated with the Arab uprisings are posing an increased threat to peace in the Near East (*see map of strategic risks and instabilities liable to affect French interests*).

The end of the American military presence in Iraq marks a new beginning for the country. While its domestic security situation remains very fragile (severe terrorist threat, an internal political crisis and an exacerbation of the antagonism between Sunnis and Shias) and the reconstruction of the State and its institutions is a long way from being completed, Iraq will have to face within its territory the repercussions of the transformations in the Arab world (particularly the Syrian crisis) and of the Iranian crisis. American military withdrawal could furthermore grant a more prominent, sometimes competitive and even conflictual role to neighbouring regional powers, particularly Iran, whose influence in Iraq is growing.

The gradual withdrawal of Western forces from Afghanistan will be accompanied by a transfer of responsibilities to the Afghan security forces by 2014. The success of this transitional phase is highly uncertain, owing to the continued existence of the insurrection and political uncertainties. It will depend in particular on major advances being made in the national reconciliation process, the involvement of regional powers (particularly Pakistan) into the political settlement of the crisis and the existence of a potent, consistent exterior military, political and economic support in favour of Kabul. Afghanistan will remain a topic of concern for several years to come both for Western powers and for the States in the region itself.

Pakistan's fragilities, including the gradual erosion of the authority of the State and federal institutions and the economic difficulties facing the country, are expected to be accentuated over coming years. The risk of instability in this State, which possesses nuclear weapons, is major cause for concern. Any such instability would be an aggravating factor for the international terrorist threat and could have adverse consequences on Indo-Pakistani relations, highlighting the risk of an escalation between the two neighbouring countries that could have worldwide repercussions.


Battles for influence between States in Asia

Although the risk of major conflicts between States remains low in the greater part of the world, it continues to be present, if not magnified, in Asia.

Several Central Asian States have developed significant internal weaknesses that have increased since 2008 (the crisis in Kirghizstan, the development of Islamist radicalism and organised crime, etc.). These fragilities could worsen further if the transition in Afghanistan fails to bring the expected result.

The continuing existence of territorial disputes between regional powers (Kashmir, Chinese-Indian border and Afghan-Pakistani border), the instability of the Korean peninsula in the context of the succession of Kim Jong-Il and the tensions surrounding Taiwan have the potential to give rise to crises. Tensions have also grown in Asian maritime areas - including the Eastern and Southern China seas - between China and its neighbours (Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines).

RISKS AND STRATEGIC INSTABILITY LIABLE TO AFFECT FRENCH INTERESTS



The American system of military alliances is liable to remain the cornerstone of the region's strategic stability for the next fifteen years. The stance and role of the US – as illustrated by its stated position in favour of reinforcing traditional alliances, founding new partnerships and promoting regional multilateral authorities – will determine the direction taken by inter-State relations and the security situation in Asia. The establishment of a permanent American military presence at the Darwin military base in Australia from 2012 onwards is a testament to the US desire to strengthen its presence in the region over the long term.

France is present in the Pacific zone and is developing strong partnerships with Australia and New Zealand.

Vulnerabilities confirmed

The rapidly growing reality of the cyber threat

The White Paper gave particular importance to cybernetic issues. It stated the possibility of a major computer attack against national IT systems within fifteen years and presented the “cyber war” as the central element of a probable scenario of strategic rupture. Since 2008, the risks and threats faced by cyberspace have come true to a significant extent, as cyberspace became an arena of confrontation in its own right, with the rapid rise in importance of cyber espionage and the multiplication in the number of cyber attacks aimed against States, institutions and companies. The risks identified by the White Paper as long-term ones have thus already materialised in part, and the threat has now reached strategic dimensions.

One type of threat in cyberspace is that of crime. The generalisation of new information technologies, especially the internet, has not only given criminal organisations the means of carrying out their traditional activities, but also enabled criminal phenomena specific to cyberspace to emerge. As do legitimate companies, criminal organisations take advantage of the opportunities offered by the internet: their activities have become easier, both from a logistic perspective (communication, supplying information, technical training and providing resources) and in terms of seeking out clients or victims for scams, the sale of illegal products or the exploitation of human beings. This type of cyber threat has grown stronger since 2008, with a notable rise in the use of the internet in the workplace and an increase in online payments.

A second type of threat that has spread widely since 2008 is espionage. Computer attacks against State and corporate information systems, more particularly systems belonging to strategic business sectors, have multiplied. These attacks jeopardise the sensitive data (whether technical, commercial, scientific or other in nature) of their targets. They are often of large scale, involving lengthy preparation and precise targeting. They sometimes require resources that only a State or a major and determined organisation has at its disposal in order to be implemented. They are facilitated by the fact that it is difficult to determine their origin with any degree of certainty.

A third type of threat could in the long run be used to destroy or control remotely IT systems of any nature, which could have a strategic dimension given that cyberspace and the virtual world is becoming ever-increasingly entwined with the real world. The discovery of the *Stuxnet* internet worm³ in June 2010 illustrated in this regard that malicious code could damage critical infrastructures completely cut off from the internet, by attacking their information and control systems.

Cyberspace has thus fully become an arena for action and confrontation in its own right, where every dimension is capitalised on by an increasing number of activities. From an economic perspective, it is making an increasingly significant contribution to global growth and allows companies to become more competitive, whilst simultaneously providing a venue for unfair competition and practices that jeopardise the value chain. Its extensive social usage (2 billion people on the internet and 4 billion queries on *Google* every day) renders it more sensitive both to any bugs and to any internal or external malicious acts, together with any misinformation or propaganda campaigns.

Cyberspace has also become a potent vector for mobilising increasing volumes of State resources. The main powers (USA, China, Russia, UK, Germany and France⁴) have adopted passive and sometimes active cyberdefence strategies, and are developing structures intended to implement these strategies. Most multilateral organisations have addressed this question. The European Commission proposed a system for cybersecurity in 2009 and the principle of cyberdefence was incorporated into NATO's latest strategic principles adopted in 2010. A cyberdefence policy and an action plan were adopted in June 2011.

The strengthening of the capabilities of non-State players in cyberspace has also since 2008 been aimed at promoting new technologies and *modus operandi*. Subversive transnational groups of computer pirates ('*hacktivists*') have thus led campaigns aimed at harming the activities or image of States or companies. These campaigns now constitute a serious and widespread emerging threat, as shown by the nebulous *Anonymous*, which has attacked numerous commercial and State interests, and the widespread distribution of confidential information from the American State Department by the *Wikileaks* website.

Intensified proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles

Since 2008, nuclear proliferation crises have worsened, particularly in Iran, North Korea and Syria, confirming the French analysis according to which proliferation poses a threat to international peace and security.

Iran continues to be in breach of six resolutions from the United Nations Security Council and eleven resolutions from the Governing Council of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Teheran still refuses to cooperate fully with the Agency, despite the fact that the latter's report drawn up in November 2011 mentions unprecedented concerns as to the likelihood that the Iranian nuclear programme is military in nature. Under the pretext of an allegedly civil and peaceful programme - but which does not meet any of its needs from this point of view - Iran has previously sought to carry out research directly applicable to nuclear weapons and may do so again in the future. Since 2008, it has been continuing these sensitive programmes in Nantaz, Qom and Arak, including in particular the installation of centrifuges in Qom during the summer of 2011, and announced that it had tripled its enrichment capacities, now at 20 %. These activities, coupled with the intensive pursuit of ballistic testing, now leave little doubt as to Iran's intentions.

³ - The *Stuxnet* worm is a piece of malicious code that targets industrial automated process management programs. It is extremely sophisticated and was designed to take control of computers managing industrial processes and to damage very specific installations.

⁴ - For the French provision, see Part III.

The Iranian military nuclear programme

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a new report in November 2011 on the state of progress of the Iranian nuclear programme. In this document⁵, the IAEA sets out a detailed assessment of the potential military dimension of the programme, based on its own information, information provided by Iran and intelligence supplied by a dozen Member States. This information was judged credible by the IAEA. The report states that Iran has never really cooperated in addressing the Agency's doubts as to its activities in the nuclear sector and that Iran is very probably still trying to obtain nuclear weapons, while hiding behind a programme that it is describing as civil and peaceful. The IAEA drew attention to a number of especially worrying points:

- the suspicious activities pointed out in the report were being carried out in Iran as part of a centralised programme structure until 2003 as a minimum. The existence, including after 2003, of supply circuits involving shell companies to obtain goods and know-how that could be used to develop an explosive nuclear device was also mentioned;
- Iran is alleged to have obtained the information necessary to produce metal uranium hemispheres compatible with the manufacture of a nuclear device, whilst taking pains to conceal the sites and activities linked with uranium enrichment;
- Iran is alleged to have carried out advanced work on developing a specific "multiple-point" priming system used in some known explosive nuclear devices. With regard to detonators, Iran has acknowledged that it has developed safe and rapid specific "bridge wire" detonators, officially for civilian use. The IAEA notes that such detonators could be used in a nuclear device;
- experiments intended to verify the operation of a device without using fissile material ("cold tests") have allegedly been prepared;
- the IAEA disclosed some particularly disturbing information on work carried out in 2008 and 2009, intended to imitate a nuclear explosion, and revealed that it had further information on preparatory experiments that would prove useful were Iran to test an explosive nuclear device;
- the Agency stated that it had been informed that Iran had carried out work on neutron sources, an essential element in manufacturing nuclear devices;
- the IAEA feels that the work that has come to its attention is credible and consistent with the addition of a nuclear warhead to a ballistic missile.

This information, factual and technical in nature, represents "cause for serious concern" for the IAEA. Some of this work, which was carried out as part of a structured programme prior to 2003, was continued after that date and may still be being carried out today.

The IAEA placed this analysis in the context of Iran's persistent refusal to meet its obligations under the guarantees it has given.

The North Korean nuclear crisis has also worsened. North Korea continues to violate the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. In a context of growing tension with South Korea, it stated that it had carried out a second nuclear test in 2009, following the test of 2006, and still refuses to cooperate in any way with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The discovery in 2010 of an enrichment plant at the Yongbyon site confirmed suspicions that the regime had been carrying out such activities for over ten years and led to new questions as to the nuclear proliferation activities of North Korea, which continues to export ballistic technologies and is suspected of exporting nuclear technologies, particularly to Iran. The death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011, followed by his succession by his youngest son Kim Jong-un, marked the onset of a period of uncertainty for the country's future and its role in the region.

The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed in 2011 that the Syrian installation of al-Kibar, bombed by Israel in 2007, was very probably a plutonium reactor used for nuclear research.

⁵ - Report of the Director General of the IAEA to the Council of Governors on the 11th of November 2011 on the implementation of the NPT guarantee agreement and the relevant provisions of the resolutions passed by the Security Council in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In parallel, the pace of ballistic proliferation has accelerated since 2008. Iran has acquired a regional ballistic strike capacity (up to a range of 2,000 km) and now has missiles with a range sufficient to target certain European countries. Pakistan has increased the range of its missiles (1,500 km). North Korea also remains very active with regard to developing its ballistic capabilities and continues to export despite international sanctions.

Chemical proliferation is difficult to detect owing to the dual nature of the chemical industry, which is in the middle of a global overhaul and whose international development is steadily modifying the geography of the risks involved. Several countries have pursued offensive chemical weapons programmes in the past, and others are suspected of doing so today. With regard to biological weapons, several countries are suspected of carrying out offensive research and development programmes, even though none of them have officially acknowledged this. In the same way as for chemical weapons, biological proliferation is difficult to detect owing to the entirely dual nature of legitimate research applications in healthcare or even the food industry.

Flows of nuclear, biological and chemical proliferation are changing rapidly. The White Paper highlighted the impact of globalisation on the proliferation of weapons and prohibited or regulated technologies. Proliferation is not confined to States. It can also involve private and clandestine networks (such as the network of Abdul Qadeer Khan⁶), thereby creating the conditions for a *continuum* between terrorism and proliferation. Since 2008, exchanges and synergies between proliferating States have accelerated. Furthermore, illegal supply networks have redoubled their efforts to circumvent the procedures implemented at an international level to fight them.

Growing rivalries in maritime spaces

Since 2008, rivalries in maritime spaces have grown owing to several factors.

The increasing rarity of land-based resources and humanity's growing needs both to secure its food supply and to have the necessary supplies of energy resources and raw materials are both leading to an increasing interest, or even greed, in accessing the resources of the oceans. The process of appropriating maritime spaces is emerging and is giving rise to new rivalries. Although few countries have clearly defined their maritime borders, numerous States (74, including France) are now claiming an extension to their continental shelf in order to extend their maritime borders and broaden the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) for which they hold usage rights.

The vital role of the free movement of ships for global growth is another strategic factor owing to the importance of maritime trade for the development of the globalised economy – this trade represents 90 % of the global volume of goods transport. The massive sensitivity of our economies to the fluidity of this trade creates new vulnerabilities and underlines the strategic importance of 'focal points' in maritime traffic worldwide, especially straits. Any threat to free passage through the Strait of Hormuz or the Suez Canal would have immediate consequences for the world economy.

Since 2008, maritime spaces have also been the scene of growing criminal exchanges (drugs, weapons, human beings and proliferation), favoured by the density of container traffic, which facilitates concealment, and by the fragility of some States unable to keep check on their own territory. These States become production or transit areas for these flows, particularly for drugs and weapons.

⁶ - The network of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani scientist who collaborated on the production of the Islamabad nuclear weapon, orchestrated a worldwide trafficking of nuclear technologies and weapons design in favour of States such as Libya or North Korea.

Maritime piracy and robbery have increased tremendously since 2008, particularly off the African coasts. The Horn of Africa is the most dangerous area (Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, extending to the East towards the coast of India). The Gulf of Guinea, an important region for the hydrocarbon industry, has seen a major upturn in the number of attacks since the beginning of 2011. The absence of any means of monitoring sea traffic and seafaring vessels, the weakness of States and the lack of any real repression on land all contribute towards the continuing existence of this phenomenon. Piracy is increasingly raising the issue of ship protection. The European response (Operation *Atalanta*) and the international response off the Horn of Africa are effective but not enough to eradicate the phenomenon.

Controlling maritime spaces is a strategic issue whose importance is being appreciated by a growing number of States. Over the last few years, the new powers have sought in varying degrees to consolidate their naval capacities to control their regional environment and to extend their reach beyond its limits. They have also engaged in operations (the fight against piracy, evacuating citizens) aimed at displaying their ambitions, testing their know-how and showing their real ability to take action at sea. In parallel to this strengthening of naval capabilities, incidents have blossomed in certain zones, not only in Eastern Asia (China Sea) but also in the Near East (tensions around the gas wells discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean).

The extra-atmospheric space: a vital and vulnerable area

The finding in the White Paper that “the extra-atmospheric space has become as vital an area for global economic activity and international security as the sea, air and land vectors” remains relevant. Reliance on space industry has grown and affects vital interests. Access to information in real time at a strategic, operational or even tactical level, the widespread use of means of positioning or even the critical role represented by monitoring meteorological conditions all rely on having permanent access to space. The security of space activities and infrastructures has thus become a major issue, especially since the risks and threats it is facing are increasing, by virtue of technological development and a strengthening in the capabilities of individual States.

The threats faced by space systems

Various technologies can be used to threaten space systems: attacking the launcher during firing, attacking the ground-based control and mission infrastructure or attacking the spatial infrastructure (the satellite). The means used can broadly be divided into five categories: kinetic energy weapons; electronic tools of war; IT tools of war; directed energy weapons; and high-altitude nuclear weapons.

Space capabilities are a significant issue and are the object of heated competition between States. The United States has retained its supremacy, whereas Europe continues to advance. France has strengthened its cooperation with the US with regard to observing space.

China, whose space budget is estimated at over 2 billion dollars, is rapidly consolidating its capabilities and has several major assets in terms of competing with the other powers in the medium term, even if it does still have a lot of catching-up to do with regard to the USA, Russia and Europe.

India is pursuing its space programme with determination and has been honing its skills for over 40 years now. France has founded an ambitious partnership with India in this sector. Brazil is relying on its economic growth to boost a sector seen as useful from an economic and strategic perspective.

Although technological and financial restrictions mean that an 'arsenalisation' of space before 2020 remains unlikely, military threats are emerging for space systems. Command of technologies associated with anti-satellite weapons is no longer confined to the US and Russia, which had developed such systems during the Cold War. China has demonstrated its mastery of such weapons and other countries could develop capabilities in this field as well. These advances are creating an unprecedented situation in a context of growing security concerns.

Technological, natural and health risks have materialised

The consequences of the accident at the Fukushima Daichi plant for civil nuclear energy

Apart from the human drama and the profound crisis into which Japan was plunged following the catastrophe, the accident had immediate ramifications for the oil and gas markets. The halt of a major part of Japan's nuclear grid required an increase in the production capacities of thermal power stations, generating additional demand in oil and especially gas markets. The earthquake and the halt in nuclear energy production also caused interruptions in industrial production and a portion of Japanese exports, to the extent that some industrial partners in Europe and the United States saw breaks in their supply chain.

However, this disaster affected global public opinion more than anything, in a world where information now circulates more quickly than ever. In the wake of the accident, international nuclear safety standards were reexamined, and an action plan for nuclear safety was adopted during the General Conference of the Nuclear and Atomic Energy Agency in September 2011, as the first roadmap at an international level towards gleaned lessons from the accident and bolstering the safety of nuclear facilities throughout the world.

Over and above this, the accident illustrated how sensitive public opinion is to technological risks and triggered a crisis of confidence in civil nuclear power in several countries, including in Europe. The fact that the accident occurred in a country with a reputation as being safe and the difficulties encountered by the Japanese authorities in managing the crisis amplified the concern felt, especially in Western opinions, driving certain countries such as Germany, Italy and Switzerland to reassess the proportion or even the presence of nuclear energy in their national energy production, despite the fact that these decisions had the immediate effect of creating heightened reliance on carbon-based energy sources, especially gas, over the short and medium term.

The accident did not however trigger a generalised rethink of the energy mix policies adopted worldwide. Thus, despite a fall in the trends identified prior to the accident, the International Atomic Energy Agency estimates that global use of nuclear power will continue to rise throughout the world over the next twenty years. This growth results from the commissioning of reactors whose construction has already begun around the world (60 in total, of which 58 are outside Europe). Nuclear energy's use is not threatened for the major powers in civil nuclear power (France, USA, UK and Russia), which, like France, have reaffirmed that they are opting for the highest level of safety and security, nor for emerging countries, particularly China (which has 28 reactors). The continuing search to diversify sources of energy supply will ensure that civil nuclear power remains a major industrial factor that generates heightened competition at an international level.

The White Paper set out technological, natural and health risks, that were liable by their scale to trigger phenomena of disorganisation or destabilisation. These risks have materialised since 2008. The Fukushima Daichi catastrophe in March 2011 showed that a major natural disaster (a violent earthquake followed by a tsunami) could trigger a large-scale industrial accident (damage to the nuclear facilities at Fukushima Daichi), in parallel to the disorganisation resulting from the destruction of or damage to infrastructures and the difficulty in providing treatment for victims.

Numerous events, such as the A/H1N1 flu epidemic in 2009 or the massive eruption of the Icelandic volcano in April 2010, in an area of particular sensitivity for international air traffic, confirmed the possibility that scenarios of disorganisation or even of blockages to flows can arise, as well as the acute sensitivity of public opinion to their consequences, especially in the West.

Worrying developments in cross-border organised crime

As stressed in the White Paper, organised crime takes full advantage of the benefits of globalisation. The opening of borders, the deregulation of economies and investments, corruption and the multiplication of 'tax havens' have accelerated the phenomenon of worldwide crime. Destabilisation associated with the economic and financial crisis and the multiplication in the number of fragile States unable to control flows within their territory also promote the spread of this type of crime.

Organised crime has thus gradually become one of the greatest threats to international security. By favouring the emergence of "grey areas", combining political, economic and social disorder, trafficking competes with and undermines the sovereignty of States, which are directly confronted with criminal organisations that sometimes even have military capabilities. Several States thus appear defenceless in the face of this rise in the level of violence associated with organised crime, particularly with drug trafficking, as shown for example by the difficulty faced by Central America in curbing the activities of local cartels, or by several African States in combating piracy. The increased strength of organised crime is furthermore bringing about a sharp increase in the level of corruption and in-fighting in attempts to reap the benefits of trafficking in certain States that no longer satisfactorily guarantee the security of their population and their territory.

The trafficking of weapons is growing, taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the acceleration in trade and the international context (regional or interregional crises). The large-scale use of the internet furthermore promotes the transfer of know-how and facilitates contacts between dealers. The most heavily-affected regions (Africa, South-East Asia and Eastern Europe) are characterised by permeable, insufficiently policed borders, major stocks of weapons and ammunition and the persistence of inter-State conflicts.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the global cocaine market represented 70 billion dollars in 2009. Europe is the second-largest market, after the USA, estimated at 36 billion dollars and 6.2 million consumers. Drug trafficking is an essential element of cross-border organised crime and has become a threat to international security and the stability of States in Latin America and Western Africa. In Mexico, 'narco-violence' has reached paroxysmal levels under the influence of the cartels, causing over 35,000 deaths over the past four years. In Western Africa, the weakness of States, combined with the scale of the material and financial resources used by drug traffickers, has encouraged the implantation and growth of cocaine trafficking from Latin America.

In Afghanistan, controlling the heroin production process relies on shared interests between the insurgents, who see it as a source of finance for arming themselves, corrupting the authorities and keeping their territory, and criminal groups, who profit from the lack of security it causes. Drug trafficking from Afghanistan has had particular repercussions for Central Asia, which has become a transit route for the markets of Russia and Europe.

In spite of measures taken at a national level, the phenomenon of piracy and maritime robbery has grown since 2008 (see §4.3).

Tensions on strategic resources are growing

The 2008 White Paper revealed that the economic growth of new powers went hand-in-hand with the growth in energy consumption and that it was generating a heightened need for natural resources and strategic raw materials. Two types of disturbance occurred as a result: harm to the biosphere - including global warming and a heightened risk of competition - or even conflicts resulting from unregulated tensions surrounding strategic supplies, particularly energy supplies.

A continual rise in energy requirements


The trend towards an unprecedented rise in global energy needs identified in the White Paper has continued. According to the International Energy Agency (IAE)⁷, growth in the economy and the world's population will bring about a rise in the demand for primary energy of around a third between 2010 and 2035. The growth of global energy demand is furthermore demonstrating the increasing importance of the emerging countries. These countries represented two-thirds of the increase in global energy demand in 2010, with China alone accounting for 25 % of the growth in global energy consumption (*see illustration below*). As a consequence of this trend, OECD countries, which currently dominate energy markets, will represent only 33 % of global demand by 2035.

Alongside the continued rise in global demand, the energy sector has since 2008 been marked by a series of crises that, although of only limited impact on the progress of trends in the long term, illustrated the instability characterising global energy supply (Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis in January 2009; Libyan crisis in early 2011; and the Fukushima Daichi power station accident in March 2011). With 80 % of energy consumed in the world coming from fossil sources⁸, the concentration of hydrocarbon reserves in areas that are unstable⁹ or difficult to access is a defining risk factor for global energy production.

⁷ - World energy outlook, 2011.

⁸ - Oil represents 33 % of the primary energy basket worldwide, coal 27 % and gas 21 %.

⁹ - 66 % of oil reserves and 45 % of gas reserves are located in North Africa and the Middle East (IAE estimates).



Since 2008, oil markets have witnessed extreme tensions associated with rising price trends and high volatility¹⁰. Although consumption is continuing to increase at a dramatic rate (demand from emerging countries is taking over from that of OECD countries), there is considerable uncertainty as to supply. Not only is the amount of reserves cause for concern¹¹; the cost of extracting them (bituminous schist in Canada or Venezuela, or wells off the coast of Brazil) is a particularly limiting factor.

The absolute and relative share of coal in the global energy basket remains very significant and should continue to grow over the next ten years, owing inter alia to the effect of the increase in demand from emerging countries (+108 % in China and +105 % in India over the past fifteen years) and a continuing high consumption by certain OECD countries (US, Germany and Poland), notwithstanding a relative slowdown in the countries of continental Europe. Coal, a very dirty form of energy (responsible for one-third of all CO₂ emissions worldwide), is nonetheless the cheapest form, in spite of a large price increase between 2003 and 2008.

The gas market, the proven reserves of which are estimated to last for 70 years, could also witness a strong growth period under the effect of a generalised increase in energy requirements. This growth is partly due to low prices in North America (the US is self-sufficient in this regard thanks to its exploitation of its schist gas reserves) and abundant supply, particularly for non-conventional gas. Sharper competition is developing between the Asian and European powers for access to Russian gas resources, in a context of heightened dependence for Central and Eastern European countries and for Germany, in light of the latter's decision in 2011 to abandon nuclear energy.

The direction taken by nuclear energy has become more uncertain in the wake of the Fukushima Daichi power station accident of March 2011, even if overall growth in demand and the generation of nuclear energy is expected to continue. Global interest

¹⁰ - The price of oil per barrel has seen some vertiginous fluctuations over the past few years: starting at 9 dollars in December 1998, it reached 145 dollars in July 2008 before falling to 32 dollars in December 2008 and climbing to 86 dollars in early May 2010.

¹¹ - Studies disagree on the date of *Peak Oil* (the moment when global production will reach its maximum before declining) but most place it between 2020 and 2030.

in nuclear power stems from the decisions of powers that have committed to it in order to reduce their dependence on fossil fuels and limit the impact of the rise in hydrocarbon prices on their economy, whilst guaranteeing access to the abundant uranium reserves¹² located in stable or relatively stable areas (Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan and Southern Africa). Using nuclear power however requires particularly costly investment (5-6 billion dollars per power plant), including over the long term, and this is liable to rise further by the stricter safety demands ushered in by the post-Fukushima era.

Finally, for both economic and environmental reasons, increasing the share constituted by alternative energies remains a major challenge for the global energy basket. Although fossil fuels remain the main source of energy and look likely to remain so over the medium term, some forecasts stress that renewable energies (bioenergy, solar energy, hydroelectric power, marine energy and wind energy) could rise in prominence significantly provided the right political choices are made and the appropriate amounts are invested in the grid infrastructures¹³ and the management of the intermittent nature of these new energy sources.

The need to secure energy resources

Energy security is a major strategic concern for most world powers, especially for emerging powers, which rely heavily on having guaranteed access to energy resources at reasonable cost in order to achieve the same economic level as established nations. The conditions for this security depend on several factors on which the main powers develop strategies. If not properly coordinated, the latter can be a source of tension at a global level.

The Arctic: an area of increasing strategic importance

Since 2008, the Arctic has been the object of growing interest from neighbouring states due to global warming, which could facilitate access to its energy resources (14 % of the world's untapped oil reserves and 30 % of its gas reserves) and mining resources, as well as open new sea transport routes.

The neighbouring States (USA, Russia, Denmark, Canada and Norway) are seeking to assert their sovereignty and consolidate their military presence in the region. Russia is operating an ambitious policy of preserving its role as a major Arctic power, consisting mainly of shoring up its military and security provisions (coastguards, satellites, aerial surveillance and icebreakers); harvesting resources from the Barents Sea and broadening its access to resources within its exclusive economic zone. Canada intends to set up a base in deep water. The US is reinforcing its airborne presence and Norway its naval capabilities.

Emerging powers (India, China and South Korea) are also seeking to carve out a niche in this area via partnerships in the energy sector and by seeking to obtain the status of observer within the Arctic Council.

Signs of a willingness to cooperate between neighbouring States have been visible since 2008: a dispute between Russia and Norway on the border between maritime territories in the Barents Sea has been settled; Canada and Denmark have entered into negotiations concerning the Davis Strait; in Illulisat in May 2008, the 5 Arctic States also declared that the Montego Bay Convention was the framework for settling disputes between them. On the other hand, these neighbouring States are seeking to exclude countries outside the zone from the Arctic Council (the applications from the EU, China and South Korea to be observers were rejected).

¹² - The identified resources represent 90 years' reserves, and unidentified resources are estimated as representing another 200 years' reserves.

¹³ - It is estimated in this regard that 4-5,000 km of electricity lines would need to be constructed in Germany.

The extent of a country's reliance on external supplies is the first basic parameter. By 2035, most Western countries and many emerging countries as well (primarily China and India) will not be able to meet their energy requirements from local production. Diversifying the energy basket is a first step towards reducing external dependence (developing civil nuclear power¹⁴, renewable energies, using non-conventional resources such as schist gas, following the model of the USA, which has become self-sufficient in gas). The pursuit of greater national energy autonomy could also be a source of tension in terms of sharing and controlling new resources, as shown in particular by maritime disputes in the China Sea, the Caspian Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean or even the Arctic issue.

The geographic diversification of sources of supply is another dimension in securing access to energy and strategic resources. It creates aggravated competition in the energy sector, particularly in Africa¹⁵, for the signature of long-term supply contracts with producing countries and the exploitation of their energy resources. The increase in rivalries is also visible via the process of appropriating maritime spaces. Although few countries have clearly defined their maritime borders, numerous states are now claiming an extension to their continental shelf in order to extend their usage rights beyond their current limits, with the objective of broadening the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and tapping into offshore resources.

Faced with the risk that heightened competition between powers to secure their energy supplies will result in tensions if not conflict, international cooperation is of crucial importance. The action taken by the IAE in June 2011¹⁶, which permitted a temporary solution to the persistent interruptions in supply from Libya whilst OPEC was unable to reach an agreement on raising production quotas, illustrated the effectiveness of collective action when faced with an exceptional situation. However, since the IAE includes only the main consuming countries of the OECD and that the share represented by those countries in global demand is falling, the question does arise of how major emerging consumers will position themselves with regard to any coordinated actions in the future. The role of the G20, which since 2009 has addressed several underlying concerns (volatility of energy prices, ineffective subsidies for fossil fuels, 'clean' energies and energy efficiency), could gain in importance in this regard.

France, which has a diversified energy basket and various energy sources, is not particularly vulnerable in terms of energy security. Conversely, the European Union as a whole is more dependent on external sources, including gas imports from Russia. The improved interconnection between the gas networks of Western Europe and the new Member States, the diversification of sources and routes of supply and the development of all of the projects for new gas pipelines that have been declared as being of European interest and the development of liquefied natural gas, the consolidation of a stable client/supplier relationship and of trust between Russia, the leading energy supplier for Europe, and the European Union, the largest market for Russian hydrocarbons, are all measures likely to improve the security of European supplies. The scenario in which the security of our energy supplies and those of Europe would be the most gravely threatened is that of a major regional crisis, particularly in the Middle East, whose energy production and transport infrastructures would suffer the consequences. This risk it might happen is however limited, given the interest of all parties involved in maintaining the continuity of the flows.

¹⁴ - Despite the Fukushima incident, the nuclear grid to be developed by 2030 should represent over 100 GW. Emerging countries will dictate the structure of the future global civil nuclear energy market, featuring 28 current and 6 future reactors in China and around 40 projects in India.

¹⁵ - As shown in particular by the increase in Chinese investment in the continent. China focuses the major part of its public development aid in Africa on Sudan, Congo and Angola, which between them provide over 80 % of the African oil intended for China.

¹⁶ - 60 million barrels released from the strategic stocks of IAE member countries.

Security of supply also depends on the security of the supply routes, which form a major strategic factor in their own right. China, for example, is seeking to forge a land-based access to resources, to complement the access it already has by sea, and to guarantee its access to Russia's oil and gas reserves. Russia is in turn seeking to consolidate its control over the gas and oil pipelines passing through Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Belarus, and is developing infrastructures that will enable intermediary countries to be circumvented when supplying the European market (such as the commissioning of the *North Stream* gas pipeline between Russia and Germany and the planned *South Stream* pipeline towards the Black Sea). Due to the increasing remoteness between consumption areas and production areas, energy raw materials are transported across long distances by sea or land (oil and gas pipelines – which can be underwater), which increases the risk of interruptions in supply.

The risk that access will be denied to other strategic resources

Strategic metals and minerals, which are essential for numerous civil and defence industries, are also generating increased demand at a global level, particularly from emerging countries. With resources concentrated in small areas worldwide, risks of difficulties in supply are arising from the increased demand posed by technological advances, insufficient investment in mining and an increasingly tight control of the export sources for certain minerals by key players in the market, such as China and Russia.

The example of rare earth metals¹⁷, which have numerous industrial applications, particularly in the defence sector, is significant in this regard. China represents virtually the entire worldwide production (97 %) of these metals, although it holds only around a third of the world's reserves. This situation is largely explained by the fact that most Western countries discontinued their production of rare earth metals in the 1980s, chiefly motivated by the impact of their extraction on the environment, but can be reversed in the medium term if other countries with reserves decide to recommence mining or develop recycling programmes.

Fiercer scientific and technological competition

In an international context characterised by fiercer competition and the rise in power of emerging countries, scientific and technological resources are a major issue for Western powers with regard to their sovereignty and economic competitiveness. However, the lead of Western countries is being increasingly disputed, for several reasons: the increasing constraints imposed on budgets devoted to research and innovation; the rapid pace at which emerging countries that benefit from significant Western exports of technology transfers are closing the gap; and capture strategies (technological looting), of which France is well aware.

Spying on new technologies, leading to the looting of some of the resources involved, has worsened since 2008, thanks particularly to a diversification of the *modus operandi* involved, which increasingly exploits vulnerabilities linked to internet traffic and new information and communication technologies.

¹⁷ - Rare earth metals are a group of minerals required for the manufacture of a great number of high-technology products.

2

However, the strategic panorama has changed since 2008

Since 2008, the strategic context has undergone significant transformations. Revolts in the Arab world have opened up a period of deep transformations in a region that is both close and of strategic interest to France. The world economic and financial crisis, then the European sovereign debt crisis, have hastened geostrategic recomposition, in particular the affirmation of the countries known as emerging countries. The American strategic standpoint has changed substantially, in particular under the effect of redirections motivated by the Obama administration. These changes, combined with that of the terrorist threat, are likely to open up a new cycle, after the one that started the day after the attacks of the 11th of September 2001.

Strategic rupture in North Africa and the Middle East

The outbreak of Arab revolts, at the end of 2010, is the most significant upheaval since 2008. It has profoundly changed the order in areas of strategic interest that are essential for France and Europe, namely the Mediterranean and the Middle East. In addition to internal political and social recompositions in many countries, these dynamics may bring about long standing changes in the regional and international balances.

The White Paper had accurately identified the structural factors (social imbalances, political blockages and deficiencies in the education systems) likely to eventually lead to situations of tension and instability in Northern Africa and the Middle East. However, on the other hand, the rapid overthrowing of regimes that were seemingly stable, the mobilisation of civilian societies and the scope of the revolts in almost all of the countries in the area had not been anticipated.

Popular revolts in the Arab world are bringing about opportunities (democratic openings), but also uncertainty (risk of instability and reappearance of authoritarian regimes). For the younger Arab generation (between 60 and 75 % of the population, depending on the country), they will constitute a founding political event for the decades to come. Their repercussions will undoubtedly be many, both in regard to the political life to come in each of the countries affected (experience of the Islamic parties, structuring of civilian society), and in regard to their effects on other countries that have as yet been little affected. The Arab revolts have placed the countries of the South of the Mediterranean at the core of France's strategic concerns.

Entry into a political recomposition cycle

While the protest movements are very different, depending on the country, all of the revolts have in common that they have occurred in situations of loss of legitimacy by authoritarian and corrupt regimes, and of deep transformation of young societies, aspiring to change and connected to the rest of the world, in particular through the increasing use of new means of communication (Internet, satellite television channels, social networking). The "Arab Spring", a multiform phenomenon whose consequences cannot yet be fully understood, has already affected, to various degrees and in various ways, almost all of the countries in the region: 16 of the 22 Member States of the Arab League have already faced various types of political instability during 2011. Though the first revolutionary situations (in Tunisia and, firstly, in Egypt) developed with limited violence, the cases of Libya, Syria and Yemen have been characterised by violent repression, which has led to situations of insurrection that may go as far as civil war.

The "Jasmine Revolution" enabled Tunisia to start a new chapter after the Ben Ali regime and started the shock wave that has propagated throughout the entire Arab world. The transition process is underway today. The elections to designate the Constituent Assembly of the 23rd of October 2011 were a first success in the exercise of democracy. The change in the internal situation will now depend in great part on the capacity of the new government, dominated by the *Ennahda* Islamic party, to secure the demands of the rebellion (opening of the political field, constitutional reform, freedom of the press, respect of fundamental rights) while responding to the basic expectations of the population, especially concerning the economic and social difficulties that they face.

Almost a year after the departure of President Mubarak, Egypt, which is the demographic giant of the region, remains in a situation of uncertainty until the current political process has been resolved. Within the electoral context, the internal situation is particularly volatile, marked by instability in terms of security, the scope of the social movements, the opposition to the role of the army and the deterioration of the economic, social and financial situation of the country. Its development will depend greatly on the relations and on the agreements signed between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (CSFA), in command during the transition after the departure of President Mubarak, and some Islamic movements. The latter have dominated the new Parliament as from the December 2011 elections, but the decisive issue for the next phase of the political process will be the choices made by the *Muslim Brotherhood* in view of the unexpected success of the Salafists: becoming closer or becoming more distant and “realigning”.

In Libya, Syria and Yemen, the protest movements have led to armed confrontations. In the first two countries, the regimes in power have refused to negotiate and have chosen to resort to force to crush the rebellions.

In Libya, where the opposition forces have achieved the fall of Ghaddafi after six months of conflict, a fragile transition process is underway.

In Syria, the rebellion has been the target of bloody repression since March 2011, leading to the death of several thousands of people, most of whom have been peaceful civilians. The double strategy of the regime, which has combined brutal repression with an attempt to communitise the internal balances of power in order to survive at any cost against an unprecedented revolt, entails the risk of plunging the country into civil war. The situation has brought about the intervention of the Arab League, adopting an action plan and sending observers, who were quickly withdrawn by the League. The latter adopted a plan inspired by the Yemen scenario (removal of President Al-Assad in favour of 1st Vice-President F. Al-Charaa) to get out of the crisis.

In Yemen, after having tried everything to delay the transfer of power to the vice-president, according to the plan of the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Persian Gulf (GCC), President Saleh finally decided to resign. He has however not necessarily said his last word.

In Morocco, King Mohamed VI adopted a lucid and determined policy that prevented a “Moroccan Spring”. The profound constitutional reforms adopted by referendum and then the legislative elections led to the peaceful formation of a government based on a majority, organised around the loyalist Islamic party *PJD*. The monarchy, and the army that is its keeper, are respected and legitimate institutions.

With the exception of Iran which was affected by a vast protest movement in 2009, of Bahrain where the still live tensions lessened after the intervention of the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Persian Gulf (GCC) and of Oman, the other countries in the North Africa and Middle East Area have been less affected as yet by the movements of revolt. However, none of these countries can be considered to be safe from a major crisis over the next ten years, due to their internal weakness and increased regional tension.

Algeria has remained distant from the Arab revolutions of the Spring of 2011, due to the relative pluralism prevailing since the end of the single party regime in 1988, to the higher degree of freedom of expression than that of other countries in the area, to some renewal in the leaders and, above all, to the refusal of the population to countenance new internal confrontations after the “black years” of terrorism. The government quickly reacted to the few violent manifestations, which had a more social than political origins, using its significant financial reserves to preserve civil peace. Aware that complete

statis would nevertheless present risks, President Bouteflika announced reforms, especially constitutional reforms, which are progressing slowly. The role of the army, which is still major but obscure for the population, is still the central issue for the modernisation and transparency of governance in Algeria.

Saudi Arabia, located in the midst of the regional upheavals, has been the stage for some protests in 2011, basically by the Kingdom's Shia population. Some reforms were made (in particular women's right to vote and eligibility). Today, it must maintain its internal stability while bearing the weight of its regional responsibilities. The Saudi Arabian Kingdom plays a decisive role in the stability of the region due to its ability to use its great economic, financial and strategic assets to support an active diplomacy. In addition, its leading situation in world oil production, its particular place in the system of American alliances and its contribution to the fight against terrorism afford it strategic importance on an international scale.

The issue of transitions bringing uncertainty

The ability of the forces that supported the protest movements to become organised into political movements is a major issue for the development of the transitions. Whilst they only initially played a very limited role in the triggering of the revolts, the forces claiming to represent Political Islam, which are deeply rooted in societies thanks to many relays and experienced leaders and enjoy sympathy related to the repression to which they have been subjected to for decades, logically benefited from the opening of the political field at the time of the first elections (Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt). While the rise to power of religious movements constitutes a structuring factor, in particular in North Africa where they had been confined to the social sphere by the deposed regimes, the countries in transition will have to reconcile the emergence of powerful political Islam with the aspirations to freedom that were at the heart of the protest movements.

The new authorities' management of the religious and cultural plurality of the Arab world societies will have a decisive influence on the social and political recombinations that are underway and on those to come in most of the countries, whilst inter-religious tensions may well be exploited in crisis situations. Shia-Sunni antagonism will continue to be a structuring factor of tension in the region. A crisis area extending from Bahrain to Lebanon, including Iraq (where the Iranian influence has continued to grow since the American intervention in 2003) is appearing. It entails serious risks of regional confrontations or terrorist acts.

The situation of the religious minorities deserves special attention. The Shia minority could acquire new influence within the political balances, in particular in Lebanon, while the situation of Christians is becoming more difficult, even precarious, in many countries. Christians have thus been the target of occasional violence in Egypt and recurring violence in Iraq (which is why the Christian community has largely gone into exile) and are very worried in Syria.

The future of the transition processes will also depend on the place and the role of the security forces, which were the pillars of the regimes that have now been deposed. In countries where they have the respect of the population, the security forces will be able to continue to play a stabilising role, as they did during the revolts. A significant difference must be made in this regard between the army and the police. Thus, in Egypt and Tunisia, the former still has a good image and has even been able to be assimilated as a support or a "saviour" of the revolution, while the police forces are still vilified and are struggling to assume their functions, even the most basic ones (traffic).

The political progress achieved thanks to the protests has still been unable to have an impact on the challenges related to employment, training, insertion into social life and resumption of national and international investments, which are necessary for growth and have been slowed down by the internal upheavals. This economic and social dimension will be a decisive element in the stabilisation of these countries and in the success of the transition processes. It is in these areas, more than in those of freedoms or political democracy, that the vast majority of the population expects concrete progress by the new leaders. The latter are aware of the considerable difference between these expectations and what can indeed be done, *a fortiori*, in a deteriorated context (world crisis, prudence of foreign investors and international lenders, reluctance of tourists to travel to these destinations, etc.).

Iran: A worrying trajectory

While it was not directly affected by the protest movements observed in the Arab countries, the Islamic Republic of Iran remains at the centre of concerns, due to the country's internal situation, regional tensions and the nuclear proliferation crisis.

More than two years after the contested re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Presidency of the Republic, which gave rise to a protest movement unprecedented since 1979, the internal situation in Iran is far from being stable. The tensions within the conservative camp in the power have continued to intensify since 2009. The protests, weakened by repression, remain active based on economic and social discontent. Systematic repression by the regime has led to a significant deterioration in the human rights situation. Under the joint effect of the sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council due to the nuclear crisis and the policy followed by the Iranian government, the internal economic situation is deteriorating.

Iran is becoming increasingly isolated on the international and regional scene, in particular due to the Syrian crisis. Developments in the regime of Bashir El Assad, Teheran's main ally in the region, will be decisive. While Iran has not been a major participant up to now in the recombinations that are underway in the Arab world, its capacity to influence regional changes, even by nuisance strategies, cannot be underestimated (support given to the repression in Syria, criticism of western intervention in Libya and of the intervention of the GCC in Bahrain, destabilizing role in the Near-East, increasing influence in Iraq). The tensions with Saudi Arabia, which perceives the Iranian threat as one of the main strategic issues of its immediate environment, have increased, based on old historical and religious rivalities.

In this context, the Iranian nuclear proliferation crisis (see Part I) is bringing with it massive issues. Deep destabilisation of the region induced by an Iran with military nuclear capabilities would cause other States in the region to want to have the same capabilities, due to their perception of the threat to their security. The lack of resolution of this crisis is thus likely to bring about a wave of proliferation and deep changes in the strategic order in the entire Middle East. This is why sanctions against this country have been considerably reinforced in 2010, in view of the worsening of this proliferation crisis. Resolution 1929 of the United Nations Security Council, which was passed on the 9th of June 2010, designated new entities involved in the Iranian nuclear and ballistic programmes. In order to increase the pressure intended to persuade Iran to give up its pursuit of sensitive activities and its refusal to cooperate, the European Union and the United States have adopted additional sanctions aimed at the energy, banking and transport sectors. The United States, as well as the European Union at France's initiative, adopted new sanctions with an unprecedented scope following the publication of the November 2011 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Reconfiguration of the regional balances

These deep changes, at the head of which is the wide scope and long term geopolitical movement constituted by the Arab revolts, should change the strategic balances in North Africa and in the Middle East in the long run. The reinforced weight of public opinion should in addition weigh on diplomatic choices and regional alliances.

The transformations underway are bringing about a strategic resurgence of North Africa. There is likely to be a significant reconfiguration of the earlier balances in the Maghreb. The influence of Libya will depend on the speed at which the new Libyan authorities can get a grip on the country's internal situation and develop their relations with the neighbouring countries.

While discrediting, weakening and eventually condemning the regime will bring about an increasing isolation of Syria on an international level (adoption of sanctions by the United States and the European Union, suspension from the Arab League), the regionalisation of the crisis, whose fallout is already affecting Iraq, Turkey and Lebanon, could grow. The deposition of the regime, which is a key player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and in Lebanon, and is the fulcrum of the Iranian set up in the Near and Middle East, would have important consequences on the development of the regional balance of power, in particular should the alliance with Teheran and *Hezbollah* be called into question.

Egypt is one of the few countries to benefit from massive American aid and to have signed a peace treaty with Israel. A major internal crisis in Egypt cannot be excluded and would destabilise part of the region, due to the demographic and strategic weight of the country. It would have inevitable repercussions on France.

The stability of the Arabian peninsula still depends on that of Saudi Arabia, as well as on the changes in Yemen. A serious crisis in this area would have decisive repercussions both on a regional and on an international level, in particular with consequences for energy supplies, for the American system of alliances and for the fight against terrorism.

Since 2002, Turkey has been seeking to consolidate its role as a regional power, in particular through an increasing presence in the Arab world on an economic level and through the strengthening of its ties with its main neighbours (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran). Its relations with Israel have clearly deteriorated over recent years. However, the instability and the increase in tension related to the Syrian crisis on its borders is a challenge for its "Zero Problems with the Neighbours" policy and brings up the question of its ability to fully assume the role of regional power that it aims to play.

Israel was caught off guard by the transformations in the Arab world and views the current events that are disrupting its security environment with concern. Despite Egypt's renewed commitment not call into question the peace treaty, the Israeli authorities fear that the "Arab Spring" will lead to the destabilisation of its neighbours (with possible consequences for the security situation in the Palestinian Territories) and to a new regional order, which would be less favourable to them due to the increasing weight of Political Islam in the countries undergoing transition. Anyway, these transformations are causing uncertainty to grow at a time when the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is more blocked than ever, while the "Arab Springs" are making the Palestinian situation seem even more unacceptable in the eyes of the people of the region, where the crisis with Iran is more threatening than ever and where transitions can be violent.

The stalemate in the peace process is a reminder that the Arab-Israeli issue remains at the centre of the regional issues. Though any reference to this conflict has been absent from the initial waves of protests, which targeted strictly national issues, the sentiment of solidarity with the Palestinians remains intact in the public opinions of the Arab world, which should continue to be highly demanding towards their governments on this issue. The *status quo* in the Palestine is pregnant with serious threats for the future. The Israeli strategy, which combines deterrence and preventive strikes, is becoming more complex and its consequences are becoming more random in this new environment.

Towards a change in relations with Western powers?

In addition to their impact on regional players, the transformations in the Arab world will have a decisive effect on all international players, in particular the Western States, called upon to deal with new interlocutors with agendas that are as yet not well known. In an environment of tension between Washington and its traditional allies, political transitions are accompanied by a wish to become independent from the influence of the United States in the region, where some countries are starting to turn towards Asia, in particular towards China. Nevertheless, the United States are still the predominant external player and should remain so for a long time. For its part, the Obama administration has redefined the American strategic standpoint (withdrawal from Iraq, diplomacy in support of the revolts) developing a pragmatic approach centred on preserving basic interests in the area (energy security, fight against terrorism and proliferation).

Geographical proximity, the historical, demographic and commercial ties, the impact on internal policy and defence issues and the possible repercussions in terms of energy supplies or migration flows are turning the changes in the North Africa and Middle East region into a major strategic issue for France and Europe. The Arab revolts have opened a long period of instability on our borders, related to the uncertainties of political transitions, to the social-economic challenges that have yet to be dealt with and to the deterioration of the security situations. The recombinations underway could present heightened security challenges, depending on the outcome of the Libyan conflict on the Sahel-Saharan problems (short term strengthening of the migration flows, spread of weapons, etc.), the risk of a domino effect of the Syrian crisis and, to a greater extent, that of new fragile States appearing and of long lasting situations of instability becoming established.

Beyond these risks and the uncertainties that they conceal, the transformations underway are a historic opportunity for democratisation and development in the Arab world. Supporting these changes and managing their consequences will therefore be one of the major challenges over the next fifteen years for our country and for Europe, who must do everything possible to preserve the stability of this geographically and culturally close environment, while remaining vigilant about respecting the promises made by these revolutions in terms of public freedom and democracy. Long lasting political instability or serious deterioration of the social-economic situation of this region would have dire consequences for the Old Continent, in terms of security and immigration.

The reconfiguration of the balance of power is speeding up under the effect of the economic and financial crisis

The reconfiguration of the balance of power identified in the White Paper has speeded up significantly under the effect, in particular, of the world economic and financial crisis. While emerging economies, in particular Asian economies, have shown greater resistance and have consolidated their position, the economic growth¹⁸ of Western countries has been badly affected.

The 2007 financial and economic crisis and the Euro Zone sovereign debt crisis in 2010

The epicentre of the economic crisis lies in the United States and it was triggered by the bursting of the American housing bubble in the second half of 2006 (a crisis known as the “subprime” real estate mortgage credit crisis), which spread throughout Europe in the summer of 2007. The analysis of the crisis and of its developments shows that it resulted from the conjunction of several factors:

- ▀ the magnitude of the deterioration in the current accounts of the Western countries, with the United States in first place, and the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves in the emerging countries¹⁹;
- ▀ the succession of a monetary and economic policy that initially favoured private household debt, in particular in the United States, and a rapid interest rate increase movement between 2004 and mid-2006, which caused the brutal bursting of the American housing bubble in the second half of 2006;
- ▀ the failure to regulate and supervise banks, insurance companies and the real-estate and financial markets, in particular in the United States and in the United Kingdom;
- ▀ the failures of the market players, such as banks, insurance companies and investment funds, as well as rating agencies and the financial press, which contributed actively to the quick circulation in Europe of assets related to “subprime” credits, which had the best financial ratings before the crisis;
- ▀ the role of the international standards, which acted as catalysts of the crisis when the housing bubble burst, in particular the international accounting standards and the prudential banking standards.

As from the bankruptcy of the *Lehman Brothers* bank in September 2008, the crisis, which was initially a localised banking crisis in the United States and Europe, took on such a scale that it caused a recession in the Western countries and affected the emerging countries, whose exports decreased steeply in 2009, requiring the implementation of economic recovery plans in all of the countries affected.

After the end of 2009, the crisis more particularly affected the Euro Zone countries through the financing of their sovereign debts by the financial markets. This new development has revealed imbalances between the Euro Zone economies, which lack effective devices to coordinate and control the economic and budgetary policies of the Member States and a permanent financial solidity mechanism. These crucial questions regarding the policy and the economic and monetary leadership within the Euro Zone are the ones to which the European Summit Meeting of the 9th of December 2011 provided the first answers (announcement of the strengthening of the budgetary discipline of the Member States and the setting up of a *European Stability Mechanism*).

¹⁸ - While between 2007 and 2010, the contribution of the G7 economies to the world GDP dropped by 8 % (and that of the European Union dropped by 15 %), that of Asian countries increased by 40 %.

¹⁹ - In China, household and company savings rose from 37.5 % to 50 % of the GDP between 1998 and 2007.

Within this context, the movement of the strategic centre of gravity towards Asia, considered as “progressive” by the White Paper, underwent a clear acceleration without the regional balances having undergone any substantial change, except for the affirmation of China. As an economic centre including most of the States known as emerging States, including China and India, and as a dynamic hotbed in matters of demographics and innovation, Asia became the epicentre of the strategic scene. The massive increase in defence budgets throughout the entire Asia-Pacific area foreshadows a military affirmation by the powers in the region. At the same time, this area concentrates many strategic and security risks: nuclear risks related to proliferation, in a region where five nuclear powers coexist, risks of conflicts among States, including great powers. Hastened by the crisis, this change in the balance to the benefit of Asia should increase and could also increasingly involve Africa and South America.

The consolidation of the Chinese growth

The consolidation of the Chinese growth, supported by the crisis, is one of the most structuring changes for the future.

Having taken full advantage of globalisation to consolidate its development, in particular through the growth of export markets, China proved to have a much greater economic resistance when faced with the crisis than the Western powers. Having snatched away from Japan its place as the world's second economy in 2010, it could, at its current rate of growth, become the world's first economy by 2025-2030, ahead of the United States and India. With foreign exchange reserves valued at more than 3 000 billion dollars, it is currently investing in regions of the world where it had little presence until now (in Africa, in particular, but also in Europe).

Though its economic development remains its absolute priority in the short and medium term, China is seeking to acquire and strengthen its capabilities in all components of power. With a defence budget that on average has been doubling every five years for 20 years, in the last few years it has spectacularly developed its military capabilities in many fields (force projection capabilities, nuclear deterrence capabilities, air and sea space exclusion and control capabilities and cyber-defence capabilities). It could have very significant projection capabilities over its broader surroundings by 2020. It aspires to become the world's leading scientific power by 2050, is also continuing to catch up very quickly in technological terms and is granting itself the financial means²⁰ to do so. Lastly, it is carrying out an active strategy to gain diplomatic influence, as is shown by the setting up of a public diplomacy office with a budget of around 9 billion dollars, by the development of international media, by the strengthening of its public development aid, in particular for Africa, and by the rapid creation of a network of *Confucius Institutes* (with around fifty of these having opened per year as from 2004). The Chinese diaspora is also a powerful transmitter of influence.

Though it sways between a wish to become a full member of multilateral bodies and unilateral affirmation of its political and military power, either on the regional level, with regard to its neighbours (Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines), or on a global scale with regard to the United States, China nevertheless maintains its three diplomatic priorities: the consolidation of its economic development by securing its exports, its access to markets, agricultural resources and energy and raw material supplies; its reunification with Taiwan, which has been declared “of vital interest” and its relations with the United States, which has always formed the central axis of Chinese foreign policy.

²⁰ - Tripling of the R&D budget in 5 years, exceeding 100 billion dollars and becoming the third in the world.

Even though it is still far from achieving strategic parity with the United States, China is already a major power. The sense that it will give this power – choosing either to assume increasing responsibilities in terms of international governance and security or to pursue the unilateral defence of its national interests – will constitute a major parameter for international stability. The future of Chinese power will, in addition, depend on its ability to overcome several factors of weakness related in particular to the scope and worsening of economic and social inequality, to the rapid ageing of its population, or even to the low level of development of its internal market, under the leadership of a new generation of leaders. To face these internal imbalances, China needs to maintain a high growth rate, currently mainly based on exports, which would involve conquering new parts of the market or developing its domestic demand, in the event of a further slump in the world economy.

Russia: between weaknesses and resurgence

While it cannot be compared to the emerging powers due to its historical trajectory, Russia is asserting its ambition to be a specific and independent centre in a multipolar world. As a major axis of Vladimir Putin's strategy, the return to a power policy noted by the White Paper has been pursued but now in a more calculated way. After the shock created by the military intervention in Georgia at the end of Autumn 2008, the announcement of the “*resetting*” of the American policy with regard to Russia in February 2009, supported by the European Union and then by NATO, opened up a period of pragmatic convergence between Russian and American interests, as well as European interests. While asserting itself as a responsible partner on several issues (Afghanistan, WTO, fight against terrorism and proliferation), in particular on strategic and security issues, Russia is seeking to assert its positions among its neighbours, in particular through the use of the energy policy (interruption of Gas deliveries to the Ukraine in January 2009) and frozen conflicts.

The Russian economy was more seriously affected than China or India by the 2008 economic and financial crisis and is facing structural weaknesses. The temptation to continue to live off energy revenues remains strong because the Russian economy is structured around raw material exports and its growth has only resumed due to the increase in the price of oil. In terms of the military, Russia has continued to adjust its capabilities with the launch, in 2008, of the military reform, which still hasn't been completed, and the adoption of a new doctrine in 2010. It has also strengthened its military presence in post-soviet space. Its military spending has increased significantly since 2004. In political and social terms, the situation remains uneasy, as shown by the December 2011 demonstrations, which were symbolic of the strengthening of Russian civil society and its demands of the government.

At the same time, Russia has decisive assets which cannot be neglected. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, with significant nuclear arsenals and oil and gas resources, Russia is still an essential player in international relations and in the definition of world balances, as has been shown by the positive initiative taken with NATO at the time of the Lisbon Summit in 2010. The privileged political relation between France and Russia contributes to reinforcing the European anchoring of the latter. The development of our strategic partnership with Russia arises from this mind-set and in particular is expressed by strengthened cooperation in the fields of space and armament.

Russia, an energy power

As the main vector for Russia's return to the international stage, its energy policy, which tends towards exports and is heavily controlled by the State, is based on significant resources on which the country's economy depends to a large extent (50 % of the federal revenue). As the world's leading producer of oil and gas, Russia is the Number One gas supplier for Europe (24 % of its gas consumption) and provides 30 % of its oil imports. Because it is heavily dependent on its energy exports, Russia is developing new gas pipelines towards Europe (*Nord Stream* commissioning, *South Stream* project) and is seeking to diversify its markets by turning towards Asia and especially towards China.

Assertion of new powers

The economic crisis and the intensification of "South-South" relations have highlighted the increasing weight of emerging countries in the world's economy and their ambition to transform their economic dynamism into political assets. Though the White Paper noted this aspiration by an increasing number of non-Western States to play a regional or world role, spurred by the effects of globalisation, it did not identify the emergence of these new powers as a major factor of strategic recombination. However, this phenomenon, reinforced since 2008, represents an increasingly marked factor of change, as these countries acquire power other than economic and are asserting a first level status in the world order.

The concept of "emerging countries"



Introduced in the 1990s, the concept of emergence designates the economic trajectory of several non-Western countries, whose demographic potential and the adoption of a market economy model have set in motion a sustained growth dynamic²¹. This has accelerated as they became increasingly inserted into international trade and, as a second effect, has been characterised by the wish of these countries to add other trappings of power to their economic weight, in particular in military and strategic terms.

The identification of the emerging countries is difficult, considering the lack of criteria to define belonging to this group and considering the heterogeneity of the countries qualified as emerging countries or that assert themselves as such. Strictly speaking, only India and Brazil currently constitute consolidated emerging powers. While possessing capabilities for action still essentially limited to their regional sphere, Turkey, Indonesia and South Africa can be considered to be part of this group. It seems difficult, on the other hand, to consider as "emerging countries" those countries for which this status is more based on a diplomatic standpoint (Russia and China) or those countries viewed as fragile States, which have structural weaknesses.

In economic terms, the crisis hastened the convergence of the emerging countries towards the Western countries, which had already been underway for more than a decade. Though it was up until the end of the 1960s, the convergence phenomenon mainly concerned only OECD countries, from now on a greater re-balancing concerning around 80 % of the world's population is underway, to the point of displacing the economic centre of gravity of the planet towards its demographic centre of gravity.

²¹ - At the beginning of the 2000s, the American investment bank *Goldman Sachs* coined the acronym BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), to designate the emerging markets, to which were added South Africa, (which was integrated to BRICS in 2010) and eleven other countries (*the "Next 11"*): Bangladesh, South Korea, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey and Vietnam. Afterwards, other financial institutions created financial indexes that were deemed to reflect the changes in emerging markets, like *Morgan Stanley* for example, which added Chile, Colombia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Morocco, Peru, Malaysia, Poland, Taiwan and Thailand and removed Bangladesh, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan and Vietnam from the *Goldman Sachs* list.

The increased economic weight of the emerging countries has resulted in an increase in their public expenditures, especially their military expenditure, with the new powers having developed their defence effort at a pace comparable to the growth of their GDP (stabilising the defence expenditure at around 2 % of the GDP for China and 2.5 to 3 % for India). In addition, most of them have made a political priority of the development of their defence industrial sector and are striving for the greatest possible industrial independence in this field and possibly to become part of the circle of great armament exporting countries. A new significant slump in the world economy, even in the growth of the emerging countries, should thus not necessarily slow down the increase in military expenditure of the latter.



The emerging countries' ability to influence, developed over the 2000s within the framework of the trade negotiations, has also become consolidated since 2008 in multilateral forums (see Part III). The rise to power of a common diplomacy is also showing through the organisation of informal forums (see the text box below), within which the main emerging powers consult with each other and coordinate their positions on the central international issues, including the strategic ones. Despite this evolution, the diversity of their interests and their situations prevails.

The capacity of these countries to sustainably participate in the setting up of regulations in a number of key fields will largely depend on their skill in managing their internal weaknesses (insufficiently developed domestic markets, inflationist tensions, high exposure to the volatility of foreign capital, demographic challenges, increasing inequality, political blockages, bad governance, identity tensions, etc.). In addition, a new slump of the world economy would weigh on the capability of emerging countries, whose growth depends largely on exports to Western countries, to find new ways to grow.

“BRICS” and “IBSA”

BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and later South Africa): using an acronym created in 2001 by *Goldman Sachs*, the first four countries came together initially around economic issues. This “club” then progressively gained strength in the political field, organising its first summit meeting in 2009, and extending to South Africa (in 2010) to strengthen its representativeness. It now regularly deals with political and strategic issues (the Iranian nuclear issue, the Libyan and Syrian crises, etc.).

IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa): association of three democratic continental powers with global ambitions, with the purpose of influencing international governance and of promoting cooperative projects. This group is unique due to its will to make the foreign policies of its members converge around common democratic values, thereby excluding China and Russia.

India-Brazil: upwards trajectories

As the only real emerging powers with international ambitions, Brazil and India have continued to rise since 2008. As members of G20 and the IBSA and BRICS forums, they have been reinforcing their status in all dimensions of power in order to play a leading role on the international scene.

India, which will eventually be the country with the largest population in the world, is undergoing rapid growth (9 % per year) and should figure among the world's four largest economies within a couple of decades. The defence budget of India, which possesses nuclear weapons, is constantly increasing (more than 10 % per year), in particular the share assigned to equipment.

For its part, Brazil has asserted its ambition to play an increasing role on the international stage, as shown by its military equipment efforts and its participation in peacekeeping operations, beyond its sphere of influence. However, even though Brazil has many assets (agricultural power, oil reserves, etc.), it is still very sensitive to external economic shocks and to international capital movements (which it is trying to regulate with taxes).

The “re-emergence” of Africa?

Emerging from several decades of crisis and marginalised on the strategic chess board since the end of the Cold War, Africa has undergone changes on an unprecedented scale in the last ten years, though its future is still uncertain.

The structural weaknesses (revenue economies, dependence on market volatility, corruption, low human development indexes, etc.), as well as political risks (difficulty in pacifying the modalities of the political competition), security risks (conflicts, terrorist threats, development of organised crime) and environmental risks faced by the continent persist. Even though the number of overt crises has decreased since 2008 and though some transition processes have evolved positively, the political transformations have not been completed.

Nevertheless, having been relatively spared by the economic crisis due to its weak integration into the world economy, the economic and social dynamics of the African continent have continued since 2008. The economic fundamentals go on improving and this trend seems likely to persist in the long term: the reduction of sovereign debts, the drop in inflation, the increase in public investments, the improvement of the terms of trade related to the increase in commodity prices and sustained growth²² are leading to an unprecedented progress of African economies.

The demographic dynamism of the continent will in addition put an end to the historic under-population of the continent, which was one of the factors for its under-development. The African population should thus more than double by the beginning of 2050, rising from 860 million people today to 1.8 billion in 2050 (20 % of the world population). Progress has been made in the treatment of endemic diseases. While Africa is still the region most affected by HIV (22.5 million people infected and almost three quarters of AIDS related deaths in the world), the effects of antiretroviral treatment are particularly visible on the African continent, which recorded a 20 % decrease in the number of deaths related to this disease since the second half of the 2000s. Despite the regional disparities, the most pessimistic predictions have not been fulfilled and the improvement should gain momentum over the next few years. In addition, at the rate of progress registered, malaria may no longer be a public health problem in the regions where the disease is endemic within the next ten years.

It is too soon to know whether Africa will be the new emerging continent. Its future demographic weight, the progress of its regional integration and its potential, which make it an area for increased competition between Western powers and new powers (India, China and Brazil) for access to its natural resources, should however afford it an increasing strategic weight on the international scene. These changes, together with the arrival of a new generation of leaders, are likely to bring about a deep transformation of its relations with the rest of the world, in particular with the former colonial powers, as well as its repositioning on the international scene.

In this context, the historical links that tie us to many African countries, the particular place of the French language in Africa, the number of our citizens who live there and the economic and trade issues, as well as the geographic proximity of this continent confirm the strategic importance for France of its harmonious development.

²² - Africa experienced a growth rate of 6 % per year between 2003 and 2010, with a higher rate than that of Latin America (less than 5 %) and that of the Euro Zone (less than 2 %), but lower than that of Asia (8 %, not including Japan).

Europe confronted by the challenges of the crisis

The 2008 crisis, followed by the sovereign debt crisis, have highlighted the weight of the structural deficits in many European countries, the weakness of some economies and have shown up increasing institutional and political tensions (resurgence of national selfishness, euroscepticism in public opinions, exhaustion of the expansion dynamics). The debt rescue and public deficit reduction policies have been exerting strong pressure on the States' capabilities and means for action, in particular in terms of defence. There is a risk that the cumulative decline in Europe of defence budgets (33 billion Euros between 2009 and 2010, that is, a reduction of 12.5 %) and R&T budgets will eventually affect technological expertise and military capabilities, the strength of the Atlantic Alliance and the industrial and technological base of European defence. These difficulties are arising at a time when the United States is revising its strategic standpoint and its defence budget, confronting Europeans and in particular the French and the British with the need to take on an increasing part of the collective security and defence effort in Europe.

Though the crisis is putting European willpower to the test and is threatening its cohesion, it could also jolt it. It has already caused the Member States and institutions to make broad reforms aimed at the implementation of economic governance. The debate about the need to continue and deepen the political and economic integration and solidarity, which has provided half a century of peace and prosperity for Europe, has thus been relaunched.

Despite the crisis and the rise of emerging countries, Europe has major resources and assets. As the world's first economic power, it can rely on the structural assets that the crisis has not eliminated and that give it a special status and influence. Its incomparable integration and solidarity model, its powerful industrial and technological structure, its competitive education system, its intervention instruments (55 % of the world total aid for development) and its crisis prevention and management capabilities enable it to deploy important influence throughout the world.


The European Union, a major economic power

The European Union is the 2nd driving force of the world economy. It has a greater GDP than that of the United States: a quarter of the world GDP is thus produced by 7 % of the world population. Europe is a major goods and services production area, with the world's largest industry providing 40 % of world production. It is in the first rank for chemicals, transport equipment, metallurgy, electronics and electrical construction, the environment and engineering industries. Its great cooperative industrial companies (*Airbus*, *Ariane Espace*) have had remarkable success. Its agricultural sector has put Europe in 2nd place worldwide. Europe is in addition the largest trading power in the world and provides 40 % of international trade. The EU is the world's largest exporter and the second largest importer. Its balance of trade showed a surplus in 2010 (of over 6 Billion Euros) after a deficit of 2.5 Billion Euros in 2009. Intra-European trade is predominant, around Germany which is the world's second largest exporter, then France and Italy. Its domestic market of 495 million consumers (almost 60 % larger than the American market) has become progressively unified through the European construction process started in 1957.

A new American strategic sequence is emerging

Whether of an economic or geopolitical nature, crises have always produced in the United States an *ex-post* re-evaluation of American power and its (re)-positioning in the world (discussions of 1970-1980 and after the Cold War). The marking down of the American “AAA” rating (August 2011), the risk of calling into question the supremacy of the dollar in a context of massive debt, that of losing its place as the largest economy in the world and the difficulties encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan, have fed the theories of the decline of the United States.

Nevertheless, more than a decline, the revision of the American strategic standpoint currently underway marks the completion of the decade after the 11th of September with a background of budgetary crisis, of generalised *War fatigue* and of new discussions on the use of the military option. The new sequence that is emerging will be marked by a significant reduction in the defence budget²³ – a first since the 11th of September 2001. These cut-backs, which will progressively take the American effort to its level at the beginning of the 2000s, should however not compromise the military supremacy of the United States (*see the graph below*).



²³ - After the failure of the Congress' bipartisan committee ("Super Committee") in charge of coming to an agreement on the distribution of 1,200 billion dollars in budgetary reductions programmed over ten years, in order to reduce the American public debt, 500 billion dollars could be cut from the defence budget as from 2013, over the 2012-2021 period, in addition to the first cut-backs decided in August 2011 for a total of 487 billion dollars.

The end of a decade of counter-insurgency interventions

The difficulties encountered in trying to build democratic constitutional States in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the means deployed and the cost of the operations, including the human cost, have led to a crisis of confidence in public opinion, which is not unlike the earlier one of the post-Vietnam era. For their part, the military authorities have developed some degree of reluctance to re-commit the American armed forces to “*nation building*” operations.

Furthermore, the Iraqi and Afghan experiences have highlighted the importance for the United States of not becoming massively engaged alone. The tendency from now on is to increasingly resort to partners and, when engaging forces, to resort to air and naval forces and indirect actions rather than long-lasting interventions with a strong footprint.

Together with a substantial reduction in the United States defence budget, a review of American external intervention methods and areas has been launched. It will in particular lead to the closing of bases in Europe, to a lower propensity to engage the military personnel over time and to a continual technological and operational upgrading aimed at guaranteeing American military superiority. Moreover, the announcements made at the beginning of 2012 by the American authorities confirm that the format of the armed forces by 2020 will no longer be compatible with the carrying out of significant stabilisation operations over time and that two of the four American brigades permanently stationed in Europe will be sent back to the US.

In regard to capabilities, the new American priorities are in particular intelligence, cyberdefense, space and special operations. From now on, the accent is on the need to counter the “common space” access denial strategies, which has led the Pentagon to confirm the launching of a stealth bomber programme and to announce the maintenance of strong submarine capabilities, the improvement of anti-missile defence and the strengthening of the resilience of space resources.

The end of the “war against terror” cycle launched by the Bush administration and of counter-insurrectional military engagements should not however lead to a neo-isolationist phase. This new order is actually more of a stronger prioritisation and selective engagement of the armed forces to prevent or to respond to a direct threat to the interests of the United.

The United States, a power in the Pacific

The new American strategic priorities presented by President Obama in January 2012 mark the end of a period that concentrated the fundamental American military effort on the “war against terror”. From now on, they are placing Asia-Pacific and the “Great Middle East” foremost, with President Obama asserting the status of “Power in the Pacific” for the United States.

The growth of Chinese military power and the increasing threat of implementation of “access denial” strategies in sensitive areas have become the greatest sources of concern for the United States and thus condition the changes in the American military system, whose outlines are beginning to appear. Already, the military taskforces that are deployed in Europe-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific are almost on a par and the naval resources are a little higher in the Pacific, following the new distribution of the resources of the American fleet implemented since 2005. The strengthening of bases and of strategic partnerships in the Asia-Pacific zone, in particular with India, has already been announced.

American-Chinese relations are unquestionably one of the main structuring factors of the balances, both on a regional scale (Asia) and on a global scale, in a context of increased

economic interdependence, with Peking and Washington wanting to avoid any direct confrontation. Their relationships are based upon dialectics of cooperation and conflict, of interdependence and balance of power, the balancing point of which is being permanently renegotiated around issues that structure the relationship (trade, monetary issues, regional security issues, human rights). Bad “management” of the most important bilateral relationship in the world could nevertheless lead to disturbances and loss of control on a global scale.

The changes in the transatlantic relationship

The United States’ progressive shift of interest towards Asia is contributing to the relativisation of the strategic place of Europe in American global strategy. While President Obama took care to reaffirm the American commitment to the existing alliances and partnerships in Europe, in particular with NATO, the American standpoint in Europe will change. Missile defence will in addition be incorporated into the American set-up in Europe.

American support was important throughout the intervention in Libya (initial offensive strikes, in-flight refuelling, intelligence, participation in the command structure, ammunitions supply, etc.). The operation nevertheless marked some change in the willingness shown by the Americans to exert their *leadership* within the Alliance. If this model of limited engagement in conflicts that do not directly affect American interests is perpetuated, the United States may no longer provide the same support to the allies as today. Meanwhile, the operation in Libya showed the European dependence on American capabilities, in particular in the fields of surveillance from the sky and in-flight refuelling.

The changes in the American standpoint linked with the economic and financial crisis and to domestic policy factors should strengthen the discussions on the issue of “burden sharing” within the Alliance and place more responsibility on the Europeans in regard to defence in general, and to their contribution to the Alliance’s capabilities in particular. These factors however do not challenge the sustainable and structural “*leadership*” that the United States want to maintain within NATO, in particular on the political level. Washington will continue to play a starring role in the defence of the European territory, in particular through the deployment of its missile defence system offered as a contribution to NATO’s missile defence.

The United States would in addition like to continue to benefit from NATO to promote the American defence industries, *a fortiori* in a constrained budgetary context.

More generally, though the 2008 White Paper only considered the transatlantic relationship from the point of view of collective security and international crisis management with military means, the consequences of the economic crisis and the change in the American standpoint could contribute to a shifting of the focus of discussions between Europe and the United States towards issues outside of the political-military field. The transatlantic relationship is now also being tested on global issues (economy, international monetary system, climate, energy, trade), even though the Alliance continues to form an essential tie.

Despite the crisis of confidence that it is going through, the United States, which has proven in the past its ability to bounce back, is still the only global power and should remain so until 2025. Its military capabilities, its demographic dynamism, its ability to innovate, its technological lead and its *soft power* tools, which are decisive in the era of globalisation, and its control of the globalisation networks (material and virtual) ensure that it will maintain pre-eminence in the long term.

The jihadist terrorist threat persists, but its nature is changing

Jihadist terrorism is still one of the main threats menacing our security. With the weakening of the historic heart of *Al Qaida* (“*Al Qaida Central*”) and the territorialisation of the jihadist terrorist sphere of influence, this threat has nevertheless undergone significant changes marked by the decentralisation of the organisation and the development of new threat centres created by the activities of movements such as *Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb* (AQIM), *Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula* (AQAP) and Boko Haram in Nigeria.

The persistence of the terrorist threat

Ten years after the attacks of the 11th of September 2001, the intensity of the terrorist threat has not waned. The West and France in particular is still a favourite target. Jihadist terrorist ideology, centred on a triple principle of rejection – rejection of Western intervention in Muslim territories, rejection of Arab and Muslim regimes with contested legitimacies and rejection of a form of moderate traditional Islam – and on resorting to violent action, have continued to convince an increasing number of local movements willing to adopt its methods.

The phenomenon of territorialisation of the threat beyond the Afghan-Pakistani area has been hastened by the proliferation of regional or local groups affiliated with *Al Qaida*, having an independent operational capability and global agenda aimed directly at Western interests.

In the Maghreb-Sahel area, *Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb* (AQIM) has continued to strengthen its operational capabilities (increasing its “*Katibat*” taskforce) and has increased its abductions. From the north of Nigeria, the sectarian *Boko Haram* group is also increasingly resorting to assassinations, abduction and attacks. In the Arab Peninsula, the appearance of *Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula* (AQAP), which is very active in Yemen and which claims in its propaganda that it belongs to global jihadism, constitutes a worrying change, while the al *Shabab* militia control much of Southern Somalia and are developing their actions in the region. In Iraq, where the security situation is unstable, the jihadist movements remain strong and directly threaten Western interests. Finally, “*Al Qaida Central*” and the Pakistani armed groups remain active in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area.

The operating methods have very little changed since 2008. Terrorist attacks still rely mainly on conventional means using explosives, whose acquisition by groups or individuals is facilitated by the widespread use of Internet and information technologies, and the development of trafficking. The number of targeted killings and abductions has increased. The hypothesis, identified in the White Paper, of a major terrorist attack using unconventional means of a radiological, chemical or biological type is still valid, even on European territory.

In addition, the threat from self-radicalised isolated individuals has been confirmed. The call for independent action, long claimed by *Al Qaida* and its affiliate groups, has been implemented, as shown by the Marrakech attack of the 28th of April 2011. The attack on American soldiers in Stuttgart in March 2011 is another clear example.

Finally, the development of terrorist actions sponsored by States cannot be excluded, as has been shown by the recent plotted attack against the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States, suspected of having been perpetrated by Iranian *Al-Quds* forces. The persistence of open crises involving States with capacity for indirect action through third party organisations means that this potential threat must be taken into account.

Decentralisation of the jihadist threat linked to *Al Qaida*

The disappearance of the historical leader of *Al Qaida*, along with the removal of more than three quarters of its leaders is disrupting the activities of the organisation in its coordinating function and as an inspirer of jihadist terrorism. Deprived of its charismatic figure, the movement could ultimately have a reduced ability to persuade and recruit, even though the new head of *Al Qaida*, Ayman Al Zawahiri, an activist of the first hour, has a strong legitimacy among jihadists.

The "*Al Qaida Central*" break-up process, which has continued and has amplified since 2008, could thus mark, not the end of global jihadism, which maintains a project and a strong capacity for harm in the world, but the end of the primacy of the central structure to the benefit of local mind-sets.

International commitment to the fight against terrorism has limited the interconnections between terrorist groups from Pakistani to the Sahel, though it persists between franchised groups acting in a relatively independent way. In addition, ties between organised crime (trafficking, piracy) and terrorist networks are limited at this time to opportunistic contacts.

The Arab revolts have shown the political effectiveness of means of action that are at odds with those used by jihadist terrorism. Nevertheless, in the short term, the long lasting instability accompanying the transformation of the Arab world, as well as the spread of weapons in Sahel-Saharan Africa, following the war in Libya, offer *Al Qaida* new opportunities to put down roots and develop. In addition, there is no doubt that the jihadist movements, which have quickly incorporated the Arab revolts into their propaganda, will try to exploit any possible failures of the democratisation and transition movements for their benefit.

3

Structural issues for our defence and security policy

The definition of the defence and security policy within the framework of the updating of the White Paper, must draw all of the consequences of the major changes that have occurred since 2008: increasing concerns in the environment close to Europe (Arab revolts, Iranian crisis); reconfiguration of the power balance and change of the American standpoint, which involve increased responsibilities for France and its partners; persistence of and changes in the terrorist threat. In this context, within the 2020 timeline set by the White Paper, our defence and security policy must incorporate some structural issues:

- *the maintaining of our strategic autonomy in a context marked by the economic and financial crisis;*
- *the transformation of the multilateral framework;*
- *the response to the main risks and threats affecting our territory and our population;*
- *conflict prevention and action in favour of international security;*
- *defence of national and European interests through the common security and defence policy, our bilateral partnerships and the Atlantic Alliance.*

The actions implemented since 2008 and France's solid assets will enable it to meet these challenges.

Maintaining our strategic autonomy as a guiding principle

In a context of an increasingly fast rate of globalisation, one of the major issues in coming years for France will be to reconcile the ambition to play a leading global role, particularly through its military capabilities and its *soft power* tools, with strong constraints exacerbated by the crisis faced by its economy, its industry and its public finances. Maintaining our strategic independence is still the best guarantee of our fundamental security and defence interests. This involves taking into account the strategic dimension of security and defence expenditure and maintaining a competitive defence industry, able to master technologies of sovereignty. Our strategic independence is based on the deterrence, prevention, anticipation and military action resources available to the authorities.

The issue of maintaining our strategic autonomy in the context of an increasingly fast rate of globalisation

France is among the countries that are most involved in economic and financial globalisation. Foreign investors are large shareholders in the major groups that dominate the French economy and in France's public debt. This situation is leading to a strong exposure to international financial markets and their variations, exacerbated by the deterioration of public finances generated by the crisis.

In a period of tension and high market volatility, control over financial information and the role of some non-governmental players (financial markets, rating agencies, international financial press, hedge funds, private standardisation bodies, etc.) are of major importance, since the public debt financing conditions depend not only on economic or financial data, but also on the consideration of political factors. The independence of our country's political choices is thus now closely linked to the requirement for control of public debt, as well as the short term assessment that the players of the international capital markets may make of the commitments made in this sense and their correct implementation.


The existence of considerable exchange reserves in the emerging countries also raises the question of the correct balance, on the one hand between the attractiveness to foreign capital to stimulate economic growth and, on the other hand, maintaining independence in the areas of sovereignty, including effective protection of scientific and technological assets against legal or illegal hostile takeovers.

The strategic dimension of the security and defence expenditures

The defence effort, whose weight is low compared to total public expenditure (4 %), has been tending to decrease over the past thirty years and defence already plays a large part in State reform. In a context of further increased financial restraint and with the need for military effort to be sustained in the long term, France faces the issue of reconciling its level of strategic ambition and the budgetary effort agreed in favour of national security.

While changes in the defence expenditure are having direct impact on the global military balance, the crisis is framed in a context of reduction, in both relative and absolute value, of the combined defence effort of the European Union countries in relation to that of the United States (the European effort represented 60 % of the American effort in 2002 against 35 % in 2011) and of the main emerging countries (the European effort having gone from 100 % to 60 % of the total combined defence effort of the BRICS between 2002 and 2011). The decrease in the absolute value of the overall defence expenditure level of the European Union since 2009 however reflects different situations: the choice to maintain an almost constant effort in France and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and the reduction of the level of expenditure in the other European Union countries on the other hand (*see the graph below*). In this context, maintaining strategic independence remains a key issue for France and also for Europe, which has become increasingly dependent on our capabilities and on those of our British partners.

Moreover, the technological gap compared to American defence systems has become a reality for most Europeans, due to the lack of sufficient European effort in terms of defence R&T. Indeed, except for the United Kingdom, the other Member States of the European Union are showing a much lower commitment to the R&T effort in the field of defence than ours. This heterogeneity within the Union is leading to a very great difference in volume between the European countries (2.3 Billion Euros) and the United States (8.2 Billion Euros).



The benefits of our strong economic and industrial defence investments and the contribution of the defence sector to the GDP, to employment and to research and development are part of the strategic nature of the defence expenditure. The defence sector in France includes more than 4,000 companies, 165,000 jobs, for a 15 billion Euro annual turnover, of which a third comes from exports. Besides the fact that the achievement of a military model requires sustained and long-term budgetary efforts, defence investments - which represent a yearly amount of around 10 billion Euros - are a selective and targeted industrial policy tool. The strong technological dimension, which has synergies for civilian markets thus stimulating the global competitiveness of French industry, the positive contribution of arms exports to the balance of trade, which has also deteriorated with the crisis, and even the not very relocatable nature of the jobs involved are all beneficial to our national industry. These elements are also part of our strategic independence and are decisive for the future of our economy and for the level of industrial employment in our country.

The issue of industrial independence in the field of defence

The place of France and its industry in the global economic competition is a key determinant of the Nation's prosperity, starting with its ability to provide sufficient effort to ensure its safety. In 2008, the White Paper noted that French industry was competitive, while pointing out that it was too fragmented, as was European industry. In this regard it advocated the implementation of an industrial strategy.

France should retain full control over technologies and capabilities to design, manufacture and support equipment intended for the areas of sovereignty. Mostly the technologies necessary for the design and manufacture of means of deterrence (nuclear, ballistic missiles, inertial guidance, submarines and cruise missiles) and information system security. The renewal of the deterrence systems over the next decade and the national cyberdefense effort should contribute to ensure the maintenance of these national assets. For most of the other security and defence acquisitions, this strategy turned to Europe with, in particular, the development of "European World Champions".

In a context of progressive reduction of European defence budgets, industrial cooperation and the export of defence equipment have become essential for the financial stability of a programme. While the defence industry sector has suffered relatively little from the most direct consequences of the crisis, it is nevertheless sensitive to the medium and long term changes in the national military expenditure and to the increasing competitive pressure in the export markets. Besides the progressive affirmation of new players in the emerging countries, competition is becoming sharper within Europe: Unlike their American counterparts, European manufacturers do not have the benefit of large economies of scale generated by a very significant domestic market and may have to outbid for technology transfers in order to win contracts essential to the sustainability of their business model.

Since 2008, partnerships in the defence sector on a European level have not brought about all of the expected synergies. Similarly, the streamlining of the European industry in regard to satellites and the emergence of a fully European aircraft builder have not progressed as expected. The obstacles to integration and industrial specialisation identified in 2008 have largely persisted. The fragmentation of the European industry persists. The sectors outside of the transnational concentration movements have remained so

overall, the various contractors having continued to reel in most of their domestic market and being engaged in fierce competition for export. In the medium term, some initiatives should nevertheless favour the achievement of European objectives in the matter of armaments, whether it is the implementation of the intra-European trade liberalisation directives or the prospects opened by the Lancaster House Treaty and the European Defence Agency.

The economic and financial crisis reinforces the need to better coordinate national efforts in favour of streamlining the European defence industry, while the budgets are shrinking and the Libyan crisis has highlighted the shortfalls in European capabilities.

Strategic autonomy by the means available to our defence and security policy

Nuclear deterrence provides the ultimate guarantee that our national independence and our independence in decision making will be preserved should another State attack our vital interests, wherever the aggression comes from and whatever the form. Together with the United Kingdom – the only other European nuclear power – we have noted that there is no situation in which the vital interests of one would be threatened without the interests of the other being threatened also.

France has never made all of the types of weapons that its technological capabilities would have allowed it to design and, on the contrary, maintains its arsenal at the lowest level possible consistent with the strategic context. Driven by a genuine desire to be transparent, our country indicated in 2008 that it had less than 300 nuclear warheads and has invited international experts to observe the dismantling of our military fissile material production facilities. Following a principle of strict sufficiency, France also completed in 2011 a process of reducing its airborne nuclear means by one third. Thus, it has led the way in terms of nuclear disarmament and will wait until the United States and Russia have reached the same level to go further.

Maintaining our strategic independence and our responsiveness also involves strengthening intelligence capabilities, a priority made clear by the White Paper of 2008. This priority has led to the creation of mechanisms providing for increased effectiveness of action, along with the National Intelligence Council, a specialised body of the National Security and Defence Council. A national intelligence coordinator ensures the smooth cooperation of the services and coordinates their actions. It advises the President of the Republic in the field of intelligence.

The technical capabilities of the intelligence services have been substantially strengthened to cope with the development of information and communications technology, in particular the Internet, and to be able to take all appropriate measures to address cyberthreats.

Around 2016 the *MUSIS* observation satellite programme will offer France increased situation monitoring and strategic surveillance capabilities, as well as assistance in preventing and anticipating crises and in planning and conducting operations. Faced with the ballistic threat, the decision was also taken to acquire an early warning satellite that, in a few years, will afford France a capacity that only the United States and Russia currently have. In the area of SIGINT, the plan is to place a satellite in orbit around 2020 that will significantly strengthen the current capabilities. These space assets will be of benefit to the strategic functions identified in the White Paper and will strengthen the strategic independence of our country.

In terms of remotely piloted and long endurance aircraft (MALE UAV), France is now moving towards the development of a new capability, in partnership with the UK, which should bring about significant operational improvements by 2020. This approach, which should help to insert Europe into this promising industrial niche that is currently completely shared by the United States and Israel, also comes from a strategic independence mind-set.

Having a satisfactory capacity for knowing and anticipating is clearly a necessary condition for the assertion of our strategic independence. However, the expression of the latter would be extremely limited in the absence of an adequately dimensioned military action capability.

It indeed seems that neither the balance of power, nor the law of force have deserted the field of relations between States or between groups of people, whoever they may be, and that the political settlement of a crisis is regularly preceded by a military success. In crisis management, exerting political influence in an independent way starts with weighing in military terms. The events in the Republic of the Ivory Coast and in Libya have confirmed this reality.

In this regard, the period that has elapsed since 2008 has been marked by a great diversity and great complexity of the situations in which our forces have been engaged. In the future, this must necessarily be taken into account in the shaping of our military setup, which seemingly will need to be distinguished by its overall consistency and adaptability. The challenges for our armed forces will be to be able to deploy remotely, to be able to endure in operations and to be able to deal with the dispersal of the areas where they are engaged, as well as the diversity and the duration of the crises in which they will intervene.

Our operations abroad, such as those conducted in the context of a permanent security role, are in fact long term: France has maintained its presence in Lebanon since 1978, in Chad for 20 years without interruption, in Kosovo for 12 years and in Afghanistan for 10 years. The complexity of the multi-dimensional crises and the difficulty in designing and implementing solutions covering all of the sectors of the life of a State or of a population explain this trend.

Due to globalisation, to France's solidarities and to its interests and ambition, the armed forces can be engaged simultaneously in areas that are remote from mainland France and distant from each other. This dispersion, which entails stretched logistics and a multiplication of contexts for action, has proved to be a particularly demanding challenge to meet.

The missions entrusted to the armed forces are moreover extremely diverse in nature, covering an increasingly wide spectrum, ranging from permanent missions to short-term missions, from war interventions to emergency rescue operations and from engagement in coalitions to independent action. In all likelihood, this trend should continue. Each operation is also part of a specific framework, especially in legal terms. The theatres of operations are themselves widely varied, both geographically and culturally, especially in environments with difficult access, such as mountain, desert or jungle areas, as well as in coastal or urban areas. The opponents come in different shapes: organised in state military structures, in militias or auxiliary forces and as groups of irregular combatants, among them terrorists, pirates, criminals or mafiosi can find a place. Meanwhile, the armed forces act most often within multinational coalitions, demanding in terms of interoperability, whilst, moreover, international organizations and NGOs have become essential in the global settlement of crises.

The armed forces are now committed in the face of determined adversaries, sometimes equipped with sophisticated weapons and seeking to circumvent the technological advantage of Western armies through the use of unusual or non-standard, especially terrorist, methods of action, that lead to a hardening of crises. Current operations are marked by instant and continual fluctuations between low-intensity actions and combat that can be violent. The tactical effects of these peaks of violence may be limited, but they deeply permeate spirits due to the resonance given to them, almost in real-time, by images and commentaries. Skilfully exploited, this strong psychological and media impact can blur the perception of the purpose of the undertaking by a public opinion that is less tolerant of violence, war and human deaths. These changes may have major strategic consequences, both on the morale of the forces and on national or international opinion.

Military engagements are in addition resorting increasingly to information systems. For these, as for the missions more generally concerning national security, the ability to use a sufficiently broad spectrum of frequencies will be an issue in the future.

A multi-lateral framework undergoing transformation

As the founding principle of collective security, multilateralism, which remains France's preferred framework for action, is changing fast. The United States' reinvestment in the UN system and the increasing use of multilateral forums by the new powers to consult each other and, if applicable, coordinate their positions in order to influence the management of global affairs, are the cause of a renewal of multilateralism, of a proliferation of bodies (regional organisations, informal forums) and of a change in the balance of power within international forums.

The centrality of the UN in collective security

The United Nations Organisation is the only really universal institution capable of offering a framework for global crisis management and guaranteeing the legality and legitimacy of the use of force. It is still the main reference as regards collective security. Despite the blocking of its reform, it is at the United Nations Security Council level that the decisions are continuing to be made in the field of international peace and security, as shown by the interventions led since 2008, whether they are peacekeeping operations or operations under a UN mandate and the command of nations (France in the Ivory Coast, in support of UNOCI) or of other organisations (NATO in Libya).

Over the past decade, the African and even more Asian countries, including China, have become, through their contributions in troops, important players in peacekeeping²⁴. However, the Western powers are the only ones currently able to provide top level military capabilities. In addition, with eight of the ten top contributors to the United Nations budget, they also bear most of the financial burden of the peacekeeping operations. As

²⁴ - China is today the 7th financial contributor and has gone from the 44th place among troop contributors in 2003 to the 15th place in 2011.

the fifth largest contributor to the UN, France participates in a significant way, as a permanent member, to the budget of the peacekeeping operations²⁵ and is still the second largest contributor of troops in the P5, after China.

Meanwhile, without questioning the centrality of the United Nations, almost all of the regional organisations have developed their security expertise, to varying degrees depending on the region.

It is in Africa that the emergence of the role of regional organisations in crisis management is still the most prevalent. Despite the management of the Libyan crisis, which may have given the impression of a paralysis of the collective security instruments in Africa, the African Union (AU), with its sub-regional organisations and the gradual establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF), is the most advanced organisation in terms of institutional development and interventions in crisis management.

In the Middle East, the Arab League has also politically crossed a crucial threshold in deciding that the internal affairs of its members could, under some circumstances, be within its remit. It was this decision that led to the adoption of resolutions 1970 and 1973 of the United Nations Security Council and paved the way for the intervention in Libya. A similar mind-set is behind the current efforts of the Arab League with regard to Syria. The Gulf Cooperation Council GCC²⁶ has also played an important role in Yemen and Bahrain.

On the American continent, UNASUR²⁷ has established a Defence Council, whose proclaimed purpose is to create a “South-American Defence” identity and that has the function of coordinating the contributions of its members to the peacekeeping operations (used within the framework of the United Nations mission in Haiti).

In contrast, in Asia, the prevalence of a power struggle mind-set, coupled with a nationalist propensity, with tensions related to sovereignty issues and with the persistence of territorial disputes, hampers regional integration and, *a fortiori*, the creation of a security structure.

Since 2008, the BRICS and IBSA forums (*see Part II*) have been seeking to develop tools for cooperating in security matters.

The West must now reckon with the major emerging countries

The emerging powers abilities to wield influence in multilateral organisations are becoming stronger. Within the UN, their action has led to the formation of coalitions and influence groups disconnected from regional mind-sets. The formation of new alliances between countries that defend a view of international relations based on respect for the sovereignty of States and a restrictive notion of the United Nations Security Council mandate could reduce the room to manoeuvre for the Western countries in multilateral forums in the future. The ability of the latter to motivate international interventions could be weakened due to the emerging countries and the reluctance of public opinion to resort to the use of armed force.

Since 2008, the Security Council has extended its scope, in particular in regard to the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, as shown by the votes on Resolution 1975 on the Ivory Coast and Resolutions 1970 and 1973 on Libya, which were the first

²⁵ - Share of just over 7.5 % for the budget of the peacekeeping operations, against a little more than 6 % for the regular budget.

²⁶ - GCC or CCASG (Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Persian Gulf): Regional organisation instituted in 1981 to ensure the economic and political stability of this region and comprising to date Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar.

²⁷ - UNASUR: Union of South American Nations. An organisation created in 2010 in Brasilia, uniting the 12 South American States (with Mexico and Panama as observers), in particular to deal with issues of economic development, immigration and defence policy.

implementations of the responsibility to protect. The action of the Security Council has thus accredited the idea of a renewed crisis management doctrine. The question now arises as to whether this principle will gradually become a reference for collective security action, establishing a new balance between the rights of individuals and peoples and the duties of States, or whether on the contrary, its first implementations, which have raised tensions among the emerging countries will bring this process to a long lasting halt. In any event, the application of this principle is likely to remain occasional, responding to very particular circumstances.

The collusion of the new powers must not however be overestimated. At this stage it is more the product of a temporary convergence of interests, often based upon an opposition to the West than on a solid alliance. Serious obstacles stand in the way of the development of a common diplomacy between emerging countries, such as their ability to define shared positions on key issues of governance and security in the long term. Although the emerging countries stress their role in representing their regional environment or even the countries of the South as a whole, it is subject to some limitations, starting with the suspicion among their neighbours that they are assailed by hegemonic temptations. The assertion of these new powers could cause new divisions between the Southern countries, bringing a new hierarchy between the powerful emerging States and fragile States.

Taking into account the risks and threats affecting the territory and the population

In the coming years, France must also continue to confront the risks and the threats to its territory and population. The definition of the national security strategy (which embraces both security abroad and domestic security, both military and civilian means and both economic and diplomatic means) has led, since 2008, to the strengthening of the public authorities' means of ensuring the protection of the territory and of the population. They must be able to intervene effectively at any point in the national territory, including the French overseas administrative departments and communities which are exposed due to their location to increased threats and risks. These means must be consolidated. With the increasing speed of globalisation, the issue of the control of material and virtual flows has now arisen with enhanced acuity. The control of these flows, which can only be effective as part of a global, European and international approach, comes clearly within the framework of the continuum between security and defence issues described in the White Paper.

Overseas France

The overseas administrative departments and communities give France a world surface of primary importance - 11 million square kilometres of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the second largest after the United States - and a presence in three strategic areas of the globe, the Pacific, America and the Indian Ocean, each undergoing different changes and bringing up different national security and defence issues, made sensitive by geographic distance.

France is a reference political and maritime power in the Pacific, with New Caledonia and the communities of French Polynesia and of Wallis and Futuna. An exclusive economic area of 6.9 million square kilometres, of which 5.5 million correspond to French Polynesia, means it has maritime assets (fisheries, mineral wealth). New Caledonia and French Polynesia give France a coastal State status together with access to many regional organisations (South Pacific Commission, Fisheries Forum). Our pre-positioned forces mean that we can assert our national and sovereignty interests. They also contribute to the protection of populations, subject to strong weather hazards, as well as the general protection of the oceans and their resources.

The West Indies-Guiana zone is a crossroads where multiple geopolitical influences are felt. The United States is very present there, as well as Latin American countries (Brazil and Venezuela) and some European countries (The United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Spain) that have common interests there. It represents a strategic challenge, not only for France, but also for Europe through the establishment in Guiana of the Kourou Space Centre, the "European Space Port". However, it is also an area of significant insecurity and is the scene of a great amount of illicit transnational trafficking: narcotics, money laundering, illegal immigration (400 tons of cocaine out of a world production of 800 tons). The poverty of some local populations, which is an indirect consequence of the climate insecurity and natural disasters (earthquake in Haiti) has finally led to an increase in migration. Maintaining security in the Caribbean area is essential to prevent the formation of zones of lawlessness, in part due to major drug cartels. Because many French and European citizens are present there, there must be further means of protection and rapid evacuation in case of crisis.

The Indian Ocean is at the centre of the strategic challenges to global security and represents a key area for international trade. There are many instability factors and they are exacerbated. This area is in particular the stage for an increase in pirate activities off Somalia. In the South-West of the Indian Ocean, Reunion and Mayotte are prosperous areas in a less favoured environment, while the Scattered Islands in the Indian Ocean constitute an issue close to the major shipping lane of the Mozambique Channel. The Austral and Antarctic territories offer considerable fishing resources. As a coastal power, France is naturally involved in the maintenance of the stability in the area, where it has developed a historic French speaking legacy. Freedom of the shipping lanes and the fight against piracy and illegal immigration are important challenges.

The strengthening of the response to cyberthreats

Faced with the various aspects of a rapidly changing cyberthreat (*see Part I*), which has now reached a strategic dimension, France has operational detection and response resources. French research in the field of cryptology and technical expertise is strong and recognised as such on the international scene. This technological expertise should enable it to anticipate new techniques of attack and design effective protection measures.

As recommended by the White Paper, the National Information Systems Security Agency (ANSSI) was established in July 2009 and supervises the national information system security policy, on behalf of the Prime Minister. This policy is based on an information system security and defence strategy, made public in February 2011, which sets for France the strategic goal of becoming a world power in the fields of cyberdefense and cybersecurity.

With this mind-set, the national cyberthreat response system and the means available to ANSSI have been continually strengthened since 2008 and will increase further.

The ANSSI is the national information systems security Authority. As such, it proposes the rules to be applied for the protection of State information systems and checks the application of the measures adopted. It issues recommendations for securing the digital processes of activities of vital importance and, more broadly, of the whole information society. Since February 2011, ANSSI has also been entrusted with the role of national information system defence Authority. Within the framework of the guidelines established by the Prime Minister and in the event of a crisis threatening or affecting the security of the information systems of public authorities and operators of vital importance, it also decides on the measures to be implemented by the State, coordinates government action and has the power to impose measures on electronic communications operators.

Operationally, ANSSI has developed powerful intervention capabilities, which both ministries and strategic companies benefit from. Its operational centre ensures continuous monitoring, so that attacks and vulnerabilities that could affect the security of information systems can be detected, and coordinates the technical response of the State. In addition, for national defence purposes, France has developed technical capabilities giving it the means of controlling access to cyberspace.

France is strengthening its bilateral partnerships with its closest Allies and since 2008 it plays a driving role in strengthening the activities of international organisations in the field of the fight against cyberthreats. Taking into account the rapid development of the capabilities of emerging powers in this area, one of the major diplomatic issues for the future will be to sensitise all of the great international players, at least to the need for common standards of behaviour in cyberspace.

Within the framework of the European Union, France favours three directions for effort: the continued build up of the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), the development of an information exchange and crisis preparation policy on the European scale and the implementation of a security system for the information systems of EU bodies.

As a member of NATO, France proposed the principle of in-depth cyberdefense, a principle endorsed at the time of the Lisbon summit meeting in November 2010.

Despite the very significant progress made since 2008, increasing risks and threats require us to maintain our effort to fight against cyberthreats at a high level.

Terrorism, a threat under constant watch

Having been faced with the terrorist threat for many years, France has established a solid system for the protection of the population and the preservation of territorial integrity, based primarily on the action of the security services (police, gendarmerie and customs), the legal and intelligence services and, if needed outside the national territory, of the armed forces. Since 2008, France has further strengthened this system and continued to work within Europe and internationally.

The strengthening of the intelligence services contributes directly to the strengthening of our position to prevent the terrorist threat. The government *Vigipirate* plan, which defines a specific set of operational vigilance, prevention and protection measures, has continued to be periodically adjusted based on the threat assessment. In cooperation especially with the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany, a major effort has been made in the field of aviation security and the fight against nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical terrorism.

Ten years after the 11th of September 2001, the terrorist threat persists, but the way in which we apprehend it has evolved. The challenge is to not lower our guard, particularly since the adaptability of terrorist organisations has been proven.

The threat of ballistic and cruise missiles, a new strategic development

The ballistic missile threat hanging over the security of Europe is growing. The 2008 White Paper attached particular importance to the growth of this threat by stating that by 2025 France and several European countries would find themselves within reach of new ballistic capabilities. However, the global ballistic capabilities have continued to increase (*see Part I*). Iran already has missiles of a sufficient range to reach the territory of some European Union and NATO countries. Some of our forces deployed in operations abroad (Lebanon and Afghanistan), as well as some of our points of support, military bases and countries benefiting from defence agreements (United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait and Djibouti), are now within range of short and medium range ballistic strikes conducted by regional players.

Disruptions are still possible in the short and medium term: ballistic proliferation can allow new players, whether governmental or not, to acquire capabilities that lead to strategic or regional instability. In reality, we have not been able to prevent proliferation, in particular due to the limitations of existing multilateral instruments.

We should not allow the ballistic threat to make us forget that of cruise missiles. Indeed, the obsolescence of the current fleet of *Scud* ballistic missiles, in particular in the Middle East, as well as the deployment of anti-ballistic missile defences, may encourage States to diversify their fleets of vehicles, seeking the versatility and the precision provided by this type of missile despite their shorter range. The risk of proliferation of cruise missile technologies (and drones) is increasing, in particular due to the circulation of dual technologies and international sanctions against some proliferating States (Iran in particular), pushing them to develop indigenous industrial capabilities and develop acquisition networks outside of the control regimes.

The development of illicit trafficking and organised crime

Since 2008, to respond to the increasing threat of criminality to international and domestic security, France has continued with and strengthened its policy for fighting against trafficking, in particular drug trafficking, in order to protect the national territory and to reduce its impact on the security and stability of States. Since drug consumption is increasingly prevalent in our territory and the resulting strong underground economy weakens our social fabric, our action focuses on three areas: political mobilisation at a multilateral level in order to make the fight against trafficking an international priority, operational mobilisation in order to hinder illicit flows and actions aimed at depriving organised crime of the profits of this trafficking.

At the initiative of France, the United Nations Security Council has, for the first time, recognised the link between drug trafficking and international security with the adoption in July 2008 of resolution 1817 on the fight against the trafficking of precursor chemicals used to process opium into heroin. Similarly, the issue of the fight against drug trafficking was included among the priorities of the French Presidency of G8. France's action has also contributed strongly to the adoption in 2008 of a European Union action plan against narcotics 2009-2012²⁸.

Operationally, the purpose of France's action is to fight against the flow of narcotics. The system intended to prevent these flows has been strengthened, at the initiative of France, by the adoption of the European Pact against narcotics in June 2010 and the implementation of several cooperation and intelligence structures between the European States.

²⁸ - Approved on the 8th of December 2008 by the Council of Ministers of the European Union, this plan provides a consistent framework at EU level for the adoption of preventive and repressive measures for the reduction of the supply of and demand for drugs.

The fight against organised crime cannot be effective without resolute action to deprive traffickers of their illegally acquired property stemming the illicit financial flows that seriously undermine the functioning and development of the real economy, particularly in the most fragile states, but also in the more developed States in which traffickers invest the product of their illicit activities.

Natural and technological risks, potential triggers of a major crisis

Improving the resilience of government institutions, economic players and society is a fundamental objective of national security strategy that the White Paper has detailed in several recommendations. The main ones are to continue the policy of protection of vital infrastructures, including from now on the Internet, the improvement of population information systems and especially the consolidation of crisis management tools. The Fukushima-Daichi disaster has emphasised the need for a strong crisis management system (*see the text box below*). France immediately sought to draw lessons from this accident, by launching the adaptation necessary for preventing and responding to this type of event.

Fukushima – Daichi: A combination of events that reveals the complexity of crisis management

The Fukushima-Daichi accident showed the possible combination of a double natural disaster (earthquake, followed by a major tsunami) and a technological accident (nuclear) resulting in widespread social disruption and massive needs in terms of victim support, requiring the strong mobilisation of the armed forces (100,000 men). It also showed the importance of a good flow of information, including on the international level, in close cooperation with international organisations (in particular, the International Atomic Energy Agency) and responsive and suitable public communications. The approach to crisis management has been profoundly renewed, due to the need to take a variety of factors into account as shown by the accident.

The national security strategy objectives and recommendations in this field are detailed in a national approach to resilience, centred since 2008 around government planning and crisis management, which combine public and private operators of critical importance, local authorities, civil society and the population.

As regards the State, the interministerial crisis management structures advocated by the White Paper have been created at the central level. This integrated system aims to promote the circulation, sharing and analysis of information. It is based on the establishment of an interministerial crisis cell (CIC), bringing together all of the ministries involved in the crisis and whose activation is decided on by the Prime Minister.

Defence and security zones are the cornerstone of the system at the territorial level and are an important element of the country's capability for resilience. The zone prefect supervises the actions and crisis management in a decentralized manner in conjunction with the departmental prefects. His/her action is based on a security and defence zone interministerial staff (EMIZDS). The engagement of the armed forces on national territory in a major crisis has been redefined. In addition to the permanent positions on aviation and maritime security, an operational protection contract was assigned to the armed forces to guide their contribution to the security of vital points, the land flows essential to the life of the country, and control of access to the territory.

In addition to the missions assigned to them under the *Vigipirate* system, the armed forces have been engaged on numerous occasions since 2008 in support of public services, during storms *Klaus* and *Xynthia*, the 2010 Draguignan floods, the fires in Reunion or the H1N1 pandemic, while continuing the *Harpie* operation against illegal mining in Guiana.

Public and private operators belonging to activity sectors of vital importance are also required to participate in the national security preservation system through the development and implementation of an operator security plan and specific protection plans for points of vital importance.

The sectors of activity of vital importance

The sectors of activity of vital importance cover State civilian and military activities, legal activities and activities in the areas of food, electronic communications, audio-visual media and information, energy, space and research, finance, water management, industry, health and transport.

To date, 230 operators and 1,300 points of vital importance have been identified and incorporated into the national resilience procedure. Twenty-one national security directives have been defined, sector by sector. This regulatory and operational system is supplemented by an effort to spread a culture of prevention and knowledge on security issues to other operators, both public and private, emphasising the prevention of terrorist risks.

Local authorities are an essential link in the local system, because of their closeness to the population and to businesses and the civil defence resources available to them.

Civil society and the population constitute the ultimate link in the resilience system, which is mainly based on the population crisis warning and information system (SAIP). This system, which incorporates the media and social networks, is under development as part of an interministerial project. The national resilience approach is nevertheless not limited to public information during a crisis. It must also include educational activities aimed at developing the learning of reflex actions (confinement, evacuation) the risk culture and the spirit of defence. These actions can be conducted based on the national education system and voluntary groups.

National support, a condition for the effectiveness of the national security system

The White Paper of 2008 defined National support as the condition for the effectiveness of the national security and defence system and the legitimacy of the efforts dedicated to it. It noted that while there is a diffuse common awareness of the change of scale and nature of the threats, the instability and unpredictability of the modern world tend to reinforce the feeling that security and defence issues are not very understandable.

However, despite the increasing complexity of the world since 2008, the spirit of defence, which is part of the shared values of the Republic is now still well anchored in France. Social acceptance of security and defence issues is high, due to good awareness of the possible areas of conflict, the positive opinion about the action of the armed forces and the overall support for interventions abroad. The public support for the forces engaged in demanding situations has been clearly expressed over the last few years.

The spirit of defence is not just limited to military aspects, or to actions abroad that do not affect the everyday lives of French people. It continues to be based on the individual conviction of belonging to a national community that deserves to be protected against risks and threats. Developing this national community and raising the awareness of and informing the population, especially the younger people, continue to represent a

major challenge in a cultural and social context marked by a certain degree of isolation of individuals, lack of time, dispersion of activities and greater geographic mobility, which often contribute to the weakening of a collective sensibility. However, French people's participation in a highly developed network of associations has shown their ability to commit themselves, often voluntarily, and to forge strong social bonds for the benefit of the community.

Conflict prevention and action in favour of international security

The White Paper has indicated that national security should be based on a prevention strategy relying on diplomatic, economic, financial, military, legal and cultural means. It noted in this regard that the improvement of the international security system would involve better correlation between the international and domestic security strategies and the aid for development. France's resolute action against proliferation, the reorganisation of the French military resources deployed abroad and the deepening of the security/development approach implemented by our country are likely to strengthen France's ability to meet this major challenge.

Resolute action against proliferation

The fight against nuclear, ballistic, biological and chemical proliferation, which is part of the national security strategy, has been strengthened since 2008 through several actions implemented both internationally and on the European and national level. Under the French presidency in 2008, the European Union acknowledged its responsibilities with regard to the fight against proliferation and, in particular, its determination to confront the Iranian crisis. In addition, France was the initiator of actions intended to strengthen the international structure for the fight against proliferation. Lastly, in accordance with the national security strategy that envisages a *continuum* between internal security and external security, the French system for the fight against proliferation has been strengthened²⁹. These efforts deserve to be continued now to deal with a threat that has been further strengthened since 2008 with the development of the Iranian crisis in particular and which should be confirmed in the future.

France actively participates in the international fight against the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their delivery vehicles. It has also contributed to the international efforts in favour of the responsible development of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (international conference on the access to civil nuclear power organised in Paris in April 2010), around the issues of security (Washington summit in April 2010) and non-proliferation.

The VII Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in May 2010, was a success. The 172 States party to the treaty were able to adopt by consensus a concrete action plan based on the three pillars of the NPT (disarmament, non-proliferation and

²⁹ - The law of the 14th of March 2011 criminalises the financing of proliferation and a decree of the 2nd of November 2011 reinforces the protection of our scientific and technical assets.

peaceful use of nuclear energy), as well as on the specific issue of the Middle East. This success, after the failure of the previous review conference in 2005, has moreover taken place in a particularly demanding context, marked in particular by the persistence of the Iranian and North Korean proliferation crises.

Many initiatives in favour of nuclear disarmament had preceded the conference. These especially included the launch in December 2008 of the non-governmental “Global Zero” campaign to sensitise world public opinion and produce a global political mobilisation in favour of the total elimination of nuclear weapons; of the implementation of an International Commission on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament (“Evans – Kawagushi” Commission) in 2009 by Australia and Japan; of the Prague speech by President Obama in April 2009, in favour of the long term goal of a world without nuclear weapons, a goal adopted jointly by Presidents Obama and Medvedev during a meeting in London. The only concrete expression of these aspirations, the signing in April 2010 of the “New START” treaty between the United States and Russia, envisages the reduction of the arsenals to 1,550 nuclear warheads and limiting the number of intercontinental delivery vehicles deployed by each of the two countries to 700. This treaty has postponed the question of the actual elimination of nuclear warheads not taken into account in the respective arsenals of Russia and the United States.

Despite the hopes raised by these initiatives, progress on nuclear disarmament remains dependent on the progress in making the world safer and creating the conditions for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Thus, the implementation of the Action Plan adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the NPT will be critical to the success of the next NPT Review Conference in 2015, particularly on three priorities: the pursuit of US-Russian disarmament; the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which still has not been ratified by a number of States, including the United States, while the US Congress still opposes it; the launching of negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons (“Cut-off” draft treaty) suspended due to the persistent blocking of the Disarmament Conference (CD)³⁰.


The control of the proliferation flows must in addition deal with the rapid exchanges between the proliferating players and the quick reconfiguration of the flows. In this regard, France is aware that export control procedures are of the essence and is still a leader in this field.

The reorganisation of the French overseas military basing

The French military resources abroad, deployed in a logic of crisis prevention, have been greatly reorganised since 2008, according to the guidelines given by the White Paper based on the identification of the most critical regions for our country (*see the map of permanent French presence in the world*).

In Africa, France has conducted a review of its defence agreements, concluded, after independence, with Gabon, Central Africa, Togo, Comoros, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Djibouti. The approach is based on the principle of cooperation between partners with equal standing and the need to ensure transparency.

³⁰ - The disarmament conference operates according to the consensus rule and Pakistan opposes the implementation of the work programme including in particular the launching of Cut-off negotiations.



Created by: Pascal Orcier, 2012.

Source: compilation.

The White Paper's guidelines and the President of the French Republic's speech in Cape Town on the 28th of February 2008 gave the broad outlines for the reorganisation of the presence forces in Africa with the purpose of accompanying the rise in power of the African security forces, including the Standby Forces (ASF), of protecting the interests shared by France with its partners in Africa and of reducing the pre-positioned military taskforce while being part of a European approach whenever possible.

For this purpose, the French forces were concentrated on two main bases in West and East Africa, in Gabon and in Djibouti. A regional cooperation structure was created in August 2011 in Senegal, with a limited taskforce.

Moreover, the French military base in the United Arab Emirates, inaugurated in May 2009, has continued to expand. The mission of this base is to assert a joint presence, to deter any possible aggressor and, where appropriate, to facilitate the rapid implementation of initial actions for responding to hostile action. It is a priority point of presence in the Arabian-Persian Gulf and facilitates bilateral training and cooperation activities, while participating in the training and field experience of our own forces.

Together with regional African organisations, our forces will continue to support the rise to power of the security forces of this continent. Whenever possible, they will take a multilateral approach to security, cooperation and response to the various forms of insecurity.

The deepening of a security/development approach

The White Paper's guidelines underlining the contribution of development aid to the strategic function of prevention and the existence of a *continuum* between security and development are still relevant: poverty and weak government jointly contribute to the destabilisation of fragile areas, States or regions, promote the growth of security threats and, hence, distance some territories from economic and human development prospects. Enabling a State to guarantee the security of the population creates a favourable environment for development and helps fighting against the marginalisation of territories, offering them real development prospects, thus contributing to their sustainable stability.

This observation is shared today by the entire community of donors, including the European Union, who has significant means of funding, and its Member States. France has been carrying out actions since 2008 in the Sahel-Saharan zone using this approach. Our inter-ministerial civilian-military crisis management strategy also takes this approach.

Ambitions for a European defence

Defending France's interests is served by the construction of a European defence policy, in three sections: the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), partnerships with our European partners and the Atlantic Alliance.

The Common Security and Defence Policy is a central component of France's defence ambitions for Europe and has since 2008 been shored up by advances made in the architecture of the Union's institutions, the launch of new operations and the impetus from the French presidency of the European Union. Politically still in progress, the European defence is currently at a crossroads. The strengthening of effective military capabilities

via cooperation and pooling between Member States, and the search for a shared vision of the role of the Union in maintaining international peace and security, are therefore determining factors in the future of European defence.

In this regard, France has developed and consolidated European partnerships, particularly with the UK, under the Lancaster House Treaty. The work done in collaboration with the Germans and the Poles as part of the *Weimar Triangle* is aimed at reinforcing the CSDP.

Finally, our return to the integrated structure of the Alliance, the third pillar of European defence, can be deemed a complete success and will grant us the benefits of increased influence in this sphere. Under these conditions, the upcoming reforms of NATO will be able to take better account of our positions.

Constructing the European common security and defence policy: challenges remain but the will to move forward persists

The White Paper defends the ambition to strive for a more united, stronger and more assertive Europe with regard to defence, partially thanks to the institutional advances made possible by the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. This Treaty, which has since come into effect, gives the European Union an institutional framework enabling it through the appointment of a High Representative for foreign policy and security (also the Vice-President of the Commission) to optimise all of its resources - it is one of rare international organisations to have that much resources for prevention, intervention, stabilisation and reconstruction. The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) completes the means at the disposal of the High Representative. The introduction by the Lisbon Treaty of the mutual defence clause lays the ground for the eventual implementation by the EU of a collective defence, without affecting the undertakings made as part of the Atlantic Alliance by the States that are members. The Treaty also lays down a solidarity clause imposing on the Union and each Member State the duty to provide assistance to another Member State affected by a human or natural catastrophe or by a terrorist attack. Finally, the Treaty extended the Union's tasks in terms of defence, to encompass the fight against terrorism, conflict prevention and post-crisis stabilisation.

With 24 civil and military operations to its name since 2003, the European Union has become an increasingly important player in handling external crises. Since 2008, the situation has seen strong commitment from the European Union in the field, including in the *Eufor Chad/CAR* mission, the civil campaign *Eulex* for Kosovo, the naval operation *Atalanta* to combat piracy in the Indian Ocean and the *EUMM* monitoring mission in Georgia. These operations, in which France has played a key role both in terms of their implementation and their management, have reasserted the role of the European Union in this domain, including by sketching out the initial framework for cooperation with countries such as Russia, China or India (Russia contributed to the *Eufor Chad/CAR* operation in 2008; cooperation with China, the US, Russia and India in the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia; partnership with the USA as part of the mission to train Somalian security forces).

An overall programme was adopted by the European Council on the 11th and 12th of December 2008, under the French presidency. It is based on a shared analysis of the threats and risks coming with an updated European security strategy, a collective undertaking on the capabilities required to confront them, the acknowledgement of the strategic and economic necessity of restructuring the industrial and technological base of defence, the strengthening of partnerships with NATO and the increased responsibility of the Union in reacting to global threats.

All of these advances now need to be consolidated and capitalised on to the full. The objective remains to enable the European Union to play a more assertive role as a player in its own right in world politics, similar to the role it played in resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis, for example, and also to provide it with the means of taking greater ownership of its own security. On this latter point, the Georgian and Libyan conflicts acted as a reminder that war at the frontier of the European Union remained within the realms of possibility. This finding, and the change announced in America's strategic position in Europe (*see Part II*), directly raise the question of the European ability to handle the risks and threats facing its security, both from a military perspective and in terms of crisis prevention.

The obstacles to the strengthening of the common security and defence policy cannot be underestimated. A shared vision of the role of the European Union on the international scene and its vocation of becoming a major player in collective security, together with NATO, still has to be created, in the main. In a context marked by the economic and financial crisis and by increasing budgetary constraints, only a minority of Member States seem willing to overcome their aversion to using force and to strengthen their military capabilities to be able to participate in operations, *a fortiori* in a framework separate from NATO. The risk of a decrease in national and capability terms in light of the crisis could furthermore, if it materialised, jeopardise the future of the development of the European defence industry. The lack of a permanent European capability for steering and planning is also a major obstacle.

The economic and financial crisis calls for increased cooperation and pooling of resources between European countries to enable them to achieve economies of scale, whilst maintaining their own capabilities. Implementing this pooling of resources in practice is now becoming an autonomy issue for Europe. In this context, although the reservations expressed by the UK concerning the construction of an autonomous European defence are real, the country's commitment to an ambitious bilateral cooperation with France may in time incite other partners to engage in similar tangible efforts with regard to defence.

Developing and consolidating European partnerships

Since 2008, France has developed its European partnerships chiefly by reinforcing Franco-British military cooperation. The launch of an initiative with Germany and Poland as part of the *Weimar Triangle* was intended chiefly to strengthen the CSDP.

The Franco-British Treaty on cooperation in defence and security, signed on the 2nd of November 2010 at Lancaster House³¹, is an unprecedented rapprochement between the two largest European military powers. Based on the observation that France and the UK have similar capabilities, ambitions and interests, whilst being faced with the same limitations in terms of an ever-increasingly hostile budgetary situation, this cooperation aims to pool the resources of both countries, without either losing sovereignty over them in order to keep their respective capabilities at an optimum level.

³¹ -France and the UK signed two treaties at Lancaster House: the former was on cooperation in security and defence, and the latter on shared radiographic and hydrographic facilities with regard to our respective nuclear deterrents. These two treaties have since come into effect.

The Lancaster House Treaty

The Treaty on Franco-British cooperation in defence and security covers the two crucial dimensions of military rapprochement: the operational aspect; and the capability and industrial aspect. These two core elements are reflected in the governance structure of the cooperation.

The cooperation will be implemented by a senior-level group responsible for defining the long-term objectives and priorities of the cooperation and monitoring its progress.

It is based on:

- letters of intent from armed forces and at the combined forces level, creating a new framework of exchanges between French and British forces on operational aspects;
- the Franco-British high-level working group, responsible for the armaments field (equipment, technologies and industries).

The fight against terrorism is also part of the Franco-British partnership. Cooperation in this domain occurs within a high-level group. It has already enabled medium-term projects to be elaborated with regard to air security and CBRN and explosive-related research.

Today, this cooperation has already proven its dynamism. Since the signature of the Treaty and the “*Downing Street declaration*”³², many projects have been carried out. At an operational level, the partners decided to consolidate their interoperability by combining the three forces into a common expeditionary force, available for all missions, including high-intensity ones. Regular progress is being made in terms of capability and industry, whether in terms of the joint development of a high-endurance drone and a light antiship missile, or cooperation in support of the *A400 M* transport aircraft, the fight against naval mines, satellite communications and combating cyber attacks. Industrial cooperation has also been launched for a shared strategic vision over ten years in the missile sector, involving a single industrial partner.

The relevance of the Lancaster House Treaty was illustrated by the joint political and military commitment by France and the UK to protect civil populations in Libya. In time, the Franco-British cooperation could be used as a template for other countries on how to rationalise their capabilities via *ad hoc* rapprochements on bilateral and multilateral bases and favouring the development of industrial cooperation. This presupposes considerable political willpower and a shared strategic vision of the common security and defence policy and of NATO.

In parallel to the Franco-British rapprochement, France also strengthened its cooperation with Germany and Poland as part of the *Weimar Triangle*, with a view to giving the common security and defence policy a new lease of life. The foreign and defence ministers of this select cooperative group thus took the initiative in December 2010 of proposing an action plan along several lines: strengthening the European Union's civil and military capabilities for planning and carrying out operations, facilitating the deployment of European tactical groups, developing European defence capabilities and improving relations between the European Union and NATO. The re-launch, consolidation and extension of this initiative, in which Spain and Italy are now involved, is currently in progress.

³² - Declaration by the President of the French Republic to the British Prime Minister on the Treaty and identifying several priority fields of cooperation.

Finally, bilateral cooperation with Germany remains important. Defence cooperation between France and Germany is both extensive and highly structured. The Franco-German Brigade, the joint training school for the *Tigre* helicopter, the Franco-German training centre for close air support controllers, the Franco-German naval force and the cross-training of officers all bear witness to the scale and healthy condition of our defence relations with Berlin.

Twice a year, a Franco-German defence and security council carries out a high-level strategic dialogue between our countries. With the 22nd of January 2013 marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, strategic dialogue with Germany is actively continuing to develop a shared understanding of present and future issues in security policy and to give new impetus to bilateral cooperation.

A full NATO membership

During the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit on the 3rd and 4th of April 2009, France announced that it would participate fully in the Alliance's military structure. It has not however taken up a place within the nuclear planning group, and retains full decision-making autonomy by maintaining its nuclear independence, its freedom of assessment and its right to decide when to commit its forces. This decision to return to the command and military machine of NATO was designed to resolve a discrepancy between France's unique position and the scope of its undertakings alongside its allies. It was also intended to give a new lease of life to the renovation of the Alliance and to stimulate the construction of the European defence project.

The results of this reintegration have been largely positive. It brought an end to the defiance that our unique position brought to the minds of some of our partners and increased our sphere of influence, initiative and leadership within the Alliance. It assures us a better involvement in the planning of operations and the development of capabilities, whilst allowing us to assert our positions upstream of policy and operational decisions.

The change in the relations between France and NATO is taking place as part of the renovation of the Alliance, on which the White Paper pinned its hopes. The White Paper stressed the need to review the Alliance's objectives, based on a shared vision of risks and threats and taking account of the changes that have occurred since the previous strategic concept (1999). It distinguished two types of NATO mission in this regard: collective defence, on the one hand, which involves taking account of new risks (ballistic threat, mass terrorism, computer attacks); and managing crises or stabilising conflict zones on the other hand, making the most of its multinational capabilities and the interoperability of its allied forces.

Since 2008, the renovation of the strategic concept and the reform of the organisation have been in full swing. The Lisbon summit in 2010 saw the adoption of a new strategic concept striking a balance between the Alliance's main original mission of collectively defending its territory and the taking into account of new risks and threats (terrorism, proliferation, cyber attacks etc.). The new strategic concept also calls to mind the main founding principles of the Alliance: the indivisibility of security and collective defence, the community of values shared by the allies, the transatlantic link and the nuclear dimension of the Alliance.

Nonetheless, and despite the balanced approach that has made the new strategic approach possible, not all of the questions as to the purpose of the Alliance have been answered and they continue to be approached differently by some nations, some of them seeing NATO as a military alliance intervening on a regional basis while others see it as a global security organisation, capable of intervening in multiple sectors.

In addition to the question of the Alliance's missions, the new strategic concept and the declaration of the Lisbon summit formalised the principle of reforming the organisation at a fundamental level. The Alliance has in fact been faced with a significant increase in expenditure since the beginning of the 2000s, linked in particular with its involvement in Afghanistan. Against a background of an economic and financial crisis in which many allies are obliged to curtail their defence budgets, a widespread and ambitious reform of the Alliance proved necessary. In this regard, the allies committed to reduce personnel in the military structure by a minimum of one-third, to rationalise installations and reduce the number of branches considerably. A thorough reform of NATO's financial governance was also approved, to enable the Alliance to prioritise expenditure .

Debate currently focuses on developing capabilities, an issue that the economic and financial crisis and the drop in defence budgets in Europe have placed at the heart of the problems facing NATO. In this context, the NATO Secretary General launched the 'smart defence' initiative in late 2010, aimed at optimising Allied defence expenditure, especially in Europe. One important issue in this regard will be Europe's contribution towards consolidating the Alliance's capabilities. The launch of numerous cooperative projects, particularly between France and the UK, and initiatives carried out within the European Union will contribute towards bolstering the Alliance's capabilities.

First lessons from the Alliance's undertakings in Afghanistan and Libya

The Afghan issue and the task of overseeing the transition continue to dominate the discussions and activities of the Alliance, especially since the announcement of American and French withdrawal³³. The undertaking in Afghanistan, the largest in the history of NATO, will have showcased Allied solidarity and willingness to commit collectively and durably in a far-removed theatre to a mission for which the Alliance had not been prepared. Adopted at the initiative of France in Bucharest in 2008, the Alliance's strategy in Afghanistan is founded on an overall civil and military approach to the crisis, cooperating with Pakistan and above all the gradual takeover by Afghans themselves of their own security responsibilities. Following ten years of intervention, although it cannot be denied that progress has been made, particularly in terms of infrastructures and economic development, numerous challenges must still be overcome in the present transitional phase. One of the most important of these challenges will be to consolidate national security forces and administrative structures in a situation where the government is struggling to assert its authority over the entire territory. The success of the transition will be the yardstick by which the operation as a whole will be measured.

The operation in Libya was a major success for the Alliance. For the first time, the Europeans took the political and military leadership of a NATO operation, with France playing a key role. Although certain shortcomings amongst European allies emerged at a military level, the Alliance successfully adapted and led operations for the duration of the campaign. Politically speaking, NATO was able to preserve the solidarity of its allies, despite the latter being divided on the subject, whilst coordinating a larger contact group incorporating Arab countries, particularly at the initiative of France. The intervention in Libya revealed the differences between the allies in terms of their preparedness to devote their troops to operations (only 8 out of 28 participated in the airstrikes in Libya), whereas the new strategic concept had been adopted shortly beforehand and the Southern Mediterranean countries are at the door of Europe.

³³ - The Americans plan on withdrawing 33,000 out of 100,000 soldiers by September 2012 and 1,000 of the 4,000 French soldiers deployed in Afghanistan will be home by the end of 2012.

Solid assets for addressing these issues

With a rapidly-evolving situation characterised particularly by uncertainties associated with the economic crisis, France has some solid advantages in terms of preserving its interests.

France is the fifth-largest economic power worldwide and is one of the best integrated in terms of economic and financial globalisation. Demographically, its birth rate makes it one of the most dynamic of Western countries. It is open to the world, and is at the intersection of numerous routes linking Europe with America, Africa and Asia. Its overseas departments and territories mean that it has a worldwide presence and has the second-largest maritime space in the world. Ranked 6th worldwide in defence, France is furthermore the world's fourth-largest arms exporter. Our country is also a cultural power to be reckoned with, and occupies a first-rate position in terms of importance and influence: it maintains the second-largest diplomatic, consular and cultural network in the world, after the United States. The amount of its public spending on development ranks it 3rd in OECD donor countries, French is spoken in numerous regions throughout the world. France is a recognised nuclear and space power, and has cutting-edge scientific and technological capabilities. Its appeal is shown by the coming of 270,000 foreign students every year, making it the 3rd-largest destination worldwide in this respect.

As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a founding member of the European Union and NATO, France has committed to specific responsibilities and duties with regard to the correct operation of collective security and crisis prevention. Thanks to these assets, it has the means to address the issues that will in the future dictate the structure of its defence and security policy.

Annex

Intense commitment by our forces since 2008.

Since 2008, France has significantly extended its commitment to ensure the protection of its interests and contribute to international peace and security, whilst continuing major efforts to secure its national territory and approaches. Our forces were involved in three major operations during this period.

In Afghanistan, in the framework of NATO operations and of the strategy defined at the Bucharest summit, France took responsibility for the districts of Kapisa and Surobi in 2009 with a view to installing conditions that would enable the Afghan authorities to govern and to provide themselves security there. Faced with a very aggressive adversary, the actions carried out by French armed forces were akin to counter-insurgency measures, including high-intensity combat phases, but forming part of an overall approach incorporating military efforts to support Afghan security forces and development campaigns in favour of the population and local administrations. In practice, this holistic strategy resulted in the creation of a 'stability hub' responsible for governance and development. Moreover, France provided training for officers in the police and the Afghan national army. This strategy is a long-term undertaking that will require great steadfastness and solidarity between allies until the transitional phase is complete.

In Ivory Coast, after having ensured the protection of French citizens and supported the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) in a particularly delicate context, France made a military commitment to see the crisis exit process defined by the United Nations through to the end, after President Gbagbo's rejection of the election results. This operation was a great political success for our country. Due to France's ability to convey its interpretation of the issues involved and its solutions to its partners at the United Nations Security Council, it was able to launch a coordinated campaign between the UNOCI and the French forces (*Licorne* force) to prevent a return of civil war. The action of the *Licorne* force thus showed the benefit of having a perfectly-trained unit, well-equipped and backed up by a firm political commitment, in a national chain of command.


Faced with the Libyan crisis and the urgency of protecting civilian populations, France became heavily involved, alongside the UK, in stressing the need for a resolution from the United Nations Security Council authorising the use of force (Resolution 1973). It also promoted the creation of the contact group for Libya, whose role was fundamental in supporting the military operations conducted by NATO, as this forum allowed numerous states, including Arab countries (UAE and Qatar) to participate in NATO actions. Thanks to the close ties forged with the insurgents, France was in a position to communicate the demands of the new Libyan authorities and facilitate a swift adaptation of NATO's position with regard to changes in the situation. The first air and naval operations, launched with great rapidity, were carried out under national command. After transferring command of the operation to NATO, France and the UK proposed to implement a joint strategy, and did so successfully. The operation confirmed the birth of a Franco-British 'leading team'. Thanks to the strategic autonomy it derives from its means of action and information, France was able to play a major role in resolving the Libyan crisis, both via its political involvement and by the scope of its military commitment.

In addition to these major external operations, France continued its operations in the Balkans, chiefly in Kosovo. It maintained its presence in Chad as part of Operation *Epervier* and, from time to time, in the European *EUFOR-Chad/CAR* campaign. It furthermore participated in the fight against piracy in the Indian Ocean (the EU's Operation *Atalanta*) and led monitoring campaigns and occasional interventions in the Sahel region, where it additionally implemented an approach combining security and development to promote the reinforcement of the State's capabilities in marginalised areas. France has been present in Lebanon since 1978 and is involved in the *United National Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFL)*. France's involvement shifted in 2011, towards reserving forces for the commander of *UNIFL (Force Commander Reserve)*. At the same time, its personnel decreased slightly (from 1,500 to 1,300 men) and its equipment was modernised and adapted to changes in the situation. As part of the renewal of the *UNIFL* mandate in 2011, French involvement should enable Lebanese armed forces to exert their full sovereignty in South Lebanon.

We have also maintained a significant level of involvement for our armed forces on national territory to defend our sovereignty (Operation *Harpie* in Guiana and the fight against illegal immigration in Mayotte), protecting our territory (the *Vigipirate* system, air safety and security, State actions at sea and sea rescue) and protecting citizens from serious crises (the *Klaus* and *Xynthia* storms, and floods).

As a whole, these undertakings represent around 12,000 men permanently deployed across 6-9 main theatres since 2008 (*map of France's overseas military deployments since 2008*).

FRENCH OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS SINCE 2008





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